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Court of Appeals Case No. CA 990833

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE STATE OF UTAH

DON H. HAYCOCK, MARTHA J. SMITH
RICHARD O. HAYCOCK, MARY LOIS
PORTER
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
v.
THE ESTATE OF ELLEN S.
HAYCOCK; THE ADMINISTRATOR
OF THIS ESTATE; AND BONNIE
K. KAUFMAN, INDIVIDUALLY,
AND, DOES 1 THRU 10, INCLUSIVE,
Defendants and Appellees.

APPEAL FROM THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT^OURT OF APPEALS
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
HONORABLE SANDRA PEULER, JUDGE

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF

DON H. HAYCOCK & ASSOCIATES
7321 Westlawn Avenue
Los Angeles, California 90045
(310)641-3921
(310)641-6638 Facsmilie

REFERENCES TO PARTIES

For clarity and continuity, the parties will be identified as follows:
"Plaintiffs"

shall be Appellants-Plaintiffs: Don H. Haycock, Martha J. Smith,
Richard 0. Haycock and Mary L. Porter.

"Defendants"

will include Appellee-Defendants, the Estate of Ellen S. Haycock
and her daughter Appellee-Defendant Bonnie L, Kaufman.

"Bonnie"

shall be Bonnie L. Kaufman"

"Ellen"

shall be Ellen S. Haycock

"Obed"

shall be Obed C. Haycock

Other than Don H. Haycock, these plaintiffs did not join this lawsuit at the time it was
filed because Don H. Haycock had not been granted attorney pro hac vice status at that time.
This association has now been completed with Utah Attorney Ronald Ady. In prior pleading
these plaintiffs had been joined as defendants only to be subject to the jurisdiction of the court in
order to be part of any judicial resolution. They are all the children of Obed C. Haycock who died
on December 10, 1983.
Defendant Ellen S. Haycock is the second wife of Obed C. Haycock and the mother of
defendant Bonnie L. Kaufman.
There are no doe defendants.
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3.0 STATEMENT OF LEGAL ISSUES
Defendants Responding Brief raises the following legal issues:
1. Did the "Memorandum of Change in Testamentary Plan," that Obed signed
constitute an offer of a unilateral contract to Ellen to treat his children the same as her child
Bonnie would be treated in the distribution of her estate, and, if so,
2. Did the consideration Obed gave for this offer of a unilateral contract fail
because Ellen Haycock disinherited Obed Haycock's children, and consequently, Bonnie is
estopped from receiving any undistributed benefits from the Estate of Obed C. Haycock and the
estate of Ellen Haycock is in breach of contract to Obed's children and liable for damages..
3. May a trial judge grant a summary judgment based only on a litigants failure to
respond within the statutory ten (10) days without considering the material facts and without
issuing any grounds for its ruling other than failure to timely respond.
5. May a trial court refuse to consider a motion for summary judgment filed by
plaintiffs under Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure because it was filed after the ten(10)
day statutory time for response to the summary judgment filed by defendants.

4.0 APPELLEES-DEFENDANTS HAVE MIS-INTERPRETED THE
"STANDARD OF REVIEW,"
Appellees-Defendants mistakenly exit Jensen v. IHC Hospitals, Inc. 944 P.2d
327, 337 (Utah 1997) for the following Standard of Review: "The appellate court reviews the trial
court's grant of summary judgment for correctness, and accords not deference to its conclusions
- 1 -

of law"
This is not the standard and such a standard is not expressed in Jensen. The
correct standard of review is stated in Jensen on page 337, specifically "Because we are
reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we view the facts in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party " (page 337, left column) A copy of Jensen is Addendum No 1)
The conclusions of law is the standard of review as expressed in Schnrtz v. BMW
of North America (Utah 1991) 814 P 2d 1108, 1111 which holds that a challenge to a summary
judgment presents only conclusions of law because by definition, cases decided on summary
judgment do not resolve factual issues (underlining added)
To sustain a motion for summary judgment, the pleadings, evidence, admissions
and inferences therefrom, viewed most favorably to the losing party, must show that there is no
genuine issue of material fact Such showing must preclude, as a matter of law, all reasonable
possibility that the losing party could win if given a trial, (emphasis added) Judkm v. Toone
(Utah 1972) 492 P 2d 980, 982

5.0 APPLICABLE RULES AND STATUTES
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56 Summary Judgment, which provides
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim or
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, move
with or without supporting affidavits for summary judgment in his favor as to all or
any part thereof (emphasis added)
(c) Motions and proceedings thereon. "
-2-

The judgment sought shall be

rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions
on file, together with with affidavits, if any, show show that there is no genuine
issue of material fact. . . "
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 52
(a) Effect. "In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury, . . ., the court
shall find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law thereon . . ."

6.0

STATEMENT OF CASE

Nature of Case, The following clarifications and corrections are made to
Defendants "Nature of Case" in their responding brief (page 2)
1. The "proposed estate planning documents" to which defendants refer are wills
for both Obed and Ellen, and the "Memorandum of Change in Testamentary Plan," hereafter
"Memorandum." (Letters of Attorneys Narrvel Hall at R-309 and Hal Swenson at R-109.
2. Defendants' reference to Attorney Narrvel Hall of Ray, Quinney & Nebeker as
"an independent attorney" is not correct. The responsible senior partner managing Obed and
Ellen's testamentary documents in 1983 was Albert Bowen. Ellen Haycock had known him for,
". . . a long, long, long, long time " Also her husband who died prior to 1964 had known him.
"He was their friend for a long period of time " (Bonnie Kaufman's Deposition at 80/9 to 80/18
and Facts No. 8.6.1 and 8.6.2 of Defendants' Opening Brief).
3. It has not been proved that: "Obed and Ellen specifically discussed with Mr.
Hall [Attorney Narrvel Hall] the concept of contractually limiting the rights of the survivor to
dispose of their own assets as the saw fit and they [Obed and Ellen] rejected that concept." This
-3-

assertion was taken from a letter written by Mr Hall (R-309) which he also confirmed in his
deposition However, the personal representative of Obed, his son Ralph Haycock, has given
testimony that totally contradicts the assertions in Hall's letter and in his deposition He has
testified that it was Obed and Ellen's expressed intention - without any limitations - that each of
their estates go to all of their children in equal shares Also, Ralph Haycock testimony contradicts
that of Hall's of the meeting of April 5, 1983 when Obed and Ellen signed their Restated Trust
Agreements and Wills that Hall prepared (Addendum No 2)
Ralph Haycock's recollection is stated in a letter he sent to Ellen on December 28,
1983, or thereabouts, that states the following
"The truth Ellen is that my father really did care The part that you refuse to suggest or
even acknowledge is that you and my father made a secret covenant in the presence of Narrvel
Hall In this covenant each of you promised that the wealth that was accumulated between the
two of you, individually and collectively, at the time of death, would go to the surviving spouse
The surviving spouse would in turn promise to leave what wealth was left over at his/her death to
the six children [Obed's children and Bonnie Kaufman] " (Bonnie Kaufman's Deposition at 32/4
to 35/5)
5

Appellees mistakenly claim that the "Memorandum" was rejected by Obed and

Ellen (page 3) Although Ellen claim that she rejected the "Memorandum" there is no proof that
it was rejected by Obed and he signed it Conversely, there is undisputed evidence that his
intention was that this "Memorandum" ensure that Obed and Ellen complied with the terms of
their Restated Trusts and Wills that were prepared by Narrvel Hall and which they approved on
April 5, 1983
Course of Proceedings. Appellees-Defendants mis-state the allegations in the
complaint by falsely stating that this lawsuit was to enforce "
by Obed and Ellen and 1983

"

an oral covenant allegedly made

What the complaint alleges is the following
-4-

"He [Obed] stated that he and Ellen had discussed these concerns [that she would
out live him] and made a "covenant" that he would leave everything to her, other than the
Heber City farm, and that she would reciprocate by leaving their combined estates to his
and her children in equal shares. He wanted to eliminate the Trusts of 1979 and asked
plaintiff [Don Haycock] to prepare reciprocal documents that would accomplish this
agreement with Ellen that he represented as a "covenant" with her. Plaintiff [Attorney
Don Haycock] prepared their reciprocal wills and a "memorandum" expressing their
"covenant." (Complaint, R-4 and Addendum No. 5, the Affidavit of Don H. Haycock)
This is not a lawsuit to enforce an "oral covenant." Rather it is to enforce a the
"Memorandum" that Obed signed to enforce this "covenant" with Ellen from which she benefitted
under its terms, as restated in his Restated Trust Agreement, by entitling her daughter Bonnie to
share equally with his children in his estate. (R-198)

7.0 DEFENDANTS' MIS-STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendants Statement of Fact No. 4.. There is no dispute that what Don
Haycock sent to Obed and Ellen in February 1983 was a will for each of them and the
"Memorandum of Change in Testamentary Plan" (i.e. the "Memorandum") Defendants' vague
reference to ". . . other estate planning documents . . . " is a false representation. (Letters of
Narrvel Hall and Hal Swenson, R-309 and R-109)
Defendants' Statement of Fact No. 7. Attorney Hal Swenson reviewed the
"Memorandum" and each of the wills Don Haycock had prepared. These are the so called
"planning documents." (Letters of Narrvel Hall and Hal Swenson, R-309 and R-109), and he
informed Ellen of his conclusion regarding the "Memorandum" from his review. R-105
Defendants' Statement of Fact No. 9. Defendants failed to include the
following clarifying statement that Hall attributed to Obed regarding his alleged concern of a,
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". .. contractual arrangement, somewhat similar to that proposed by Don . . . " (R-310)
"Obed stated that he was satisfied with an arrangement which protected only the
residue of his own assets for the children and that he did not want the children to be in a
position to interfere with Ellen's use or management of those assets which were in her
own name." (underlining added) R-310
Hall does not attribute to Obed any expression or implication that contradicts the
provisions expressed in the "Memorandum" which only limits his and Ellen's right to disinherit the
other's child, or children. Nor does the "Memorandum" contradict the Restated Trusts and Wills
Hall prepared and Obed and Ellen signed on April 5, 1983. According to Hall, Obed was only
interested in Ellen's "use and management" of those assets while she was living. (R-309)
Defendants' Statement of Fact No. 10.. Appellant disputes that Ellen Haycock
did not execute any writing in which she agreed that she would not change her estate planning
documents concerning the treatment of Obed's children. She executed her "Amended and
Restated Trust Agreement" on April 5, 1983. (Addendum No. 3) This document's caption
represented to her that it constitutes both a trust, and an agreement to comply with the terms of
the trust. One of the terms was that Obed's children and Bonnie would be treated equally in the
disposition of her estate. (R-198) Obed executed a reciprocal Trust Agreement that provided for
the same distribution of his estate. Either, or both, of these parties, by this caption, could
reasonably conclude that these Trusts were agreements and the other party was bound by its
terms. Also, there is no indication from defendants that Obed did not believe that this caption
imposed contractual obligations on him and Ellen not to disinherit each other's children.
(Addendum No. 3)
Ellen's signature to a writing is not necessary for her to incur a contractual
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obligation to Obed to either treat his children the same as Bonnie in the distribution of her estate,
or that by her disinheriting Obed's children — relinquish the right of Bonnie to share in Obed's
estate and be subject to damages for breach of contract

She accepted the benefits Obed offered

in the "Memorandum," and by doing formed a unilateral contract that obligated her to not
disinherit Obed's children A unilateral contract is one in which a promise is given in exchange
for some act, forbearance or thing Restatement of Contracts, chapter 12, J Corbm 21;
Wilhston 3rd. section 13.
Defendants' Statement of Fact No. 20. Plaintiffs' Memorandum Opposing
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment that was served by Mail on July 11, 1999 On July
26, 1999 defendants served their Reply Memorandum in support of their Motion for Summary
Judgment and in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment (R- 281) Their Reply
Memorandum should have been served within five (5) days under, URCP, Rule 4-501,of
Plaintiffs' July 11, 1999 opposing Memorandum It was filed seven (7) days after it should have
been filed There is no indication Judge Peuler reviewed and/or rejected this memorandum for not
complying with this Rule
Defendants' Statement of Fact No. 21. The cited grounds for the minute entry
of August 6, 1999 was Plaintiffs failure to respond to Defendants' motion for summary
judgment in the time allowed by the rules (R-312) The judgment was entered on September 1,
1999
Following the court's minute entry of August 6, 1999, Don Haycock on behalf of
Plaintiffs served by mail on August 8, 1999 Plaintiffs' Reply to Defendants' Response to
Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment (R- 315) On August 9, 1999 Haycock, on behalf of
-7-

Plaintiffs, took the depositions of Narrvel Hall and Obed's personal representative, Ralph
Haycock.

8.0 IT WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION FOR THE TRIAL COURT
TO GRANT SUMMARY JUDGMENT BASED ONLY ON A LATE
RESPONSE TO A MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Judge Peuler's minute entry (R-312) of August 6, 1999 makes no reference to the
factual issues or the underlining legal principles on which to base a motion for summary judgment
Two days after issuing this minute entry Plaintiffs' filed their Reply Memorandum to Defendants'
Motion for Summary Judgment Although Judge Peuler states that she "reviewed the pleadings
filed in this matter," there is no indication what pleadings she reviewed or her conclusions, in any,
that resulted from this review

Her review should have included the pleadings evidence,

admissions and inferences therefrom, viewed most favorably to the Plaintiffs and conclude that
there is no genuine issue of material fact Judkm v. Toonc Utah 1972) 492 P 2d 980, 982 The
affirmance of summary judgment on appeal is appropriate only where there exists no genuine
issues if fact L&A Dnvwa/l Inc. v. Whit more Construction Co. (Utah 1980) 608 P 2d 626, 629
Judge Peuler's review failed this standard
In order to establish that there is no genuine issue of fact, a trial court's ruling on a
summary judgment motion shall comply with the provision of Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a)
unless there is no dispute as to the facts Neenng v. Utah State Bar (Utah 1991) 817 P.2d 320.
322 "In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury,

, the court shall find the facts

specifically and state separately its conclusions of law thereon,

-8-

" Utah Rule of Civil

Procedure 52(a)
u

An important reason for inclusion of the requirements that the trial court state the

ground for its decision in summary judgment cases is administrative in nature to provide a ready
basis for review on appeal However, also from an administrative point of view, failure to state
the grounds for its decision would not constitute a reversible error. Rather, in an appropriate
case, failure to do so may only justify remand to the trial court " Neenng v. Utah State Bar (Utah
1991) 680 P 2d 320, 323
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) provides

'The [summary] judgment sought

shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits,

, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact "

Defendants cite Morse v. Packer (Utah 1999) 973 P 2d 422, 424 as authority on
which a trial court can grant summary judgment for a tardy filing In this case the trial court
judge granted summary judgment on a tardy response to a motion for summary judgment
However, this issue was not appealed and is only cited as being part of the trial court record.
There was no appellate decision on this issue and trial court decisions do not constitute
precedents
Even if the rules argumento permitted Judge Peuler to grant summary judgment on
a tardy response to a motion for summary judgment, it must be based on a finding that "

the

pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits,

, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact

" URCP, Rule

56(c) A mere recitation that the court "has reviewed the pleadings" fails this test
There is no indication that Judge Peuler considered Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary
-9-

Judgment and Response to Defendant's Motion that was served on July 11, 1999 Under Rule
56(c), Neenng (supra) these pleadings were part the record and should have been considered
Also, Plaintiffs Reply Memorandum to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment that was
served on August 8, 1999 should also have been considered, even though the minute entry
preceded it, because the judgment was not issued until September 1, 1999 There is no indication
these filings were considered Certainly not considered was Plaintiffs' Reply Memorandum filed
August 8, 1999 and probably Defendants'combined memorandum of July 11, 1999 because was
seven-days late

9.0 THE RECORD CITED BY PLAINTIFFS IS PROPERLY BEFORE
THE APPELLATE COURT
Defendant complains that the depositions on which Plaintiffs rely were not before
the court when Judge Peuler issued her minute entry of August 6, 1999 and cite the following
depositions that were taken subsequent to this date Narvell Hall's deposition of August 9, 1999,
Ralph Haycock's deposition of August 9, 1999, and Bonnie Kaufman's deposition of November
29, 1999
Judge Peuler's minute entry on August 6, 1999 granted Defendants' summary
judgment because Plaintiffs failed to file any responsive pleading within the time allowed by the
rules There was no finding under URCP Rule 52(a) that there was no genuine issue of material
fact and that defendants were entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law Neenng v. State
Bar of Utah (Utah 1991) 817 P 2d 320, 322 & 323

It is therefore not relevant to argue the

record that was before the trial court on August 6, 1999 because it was disregarded by Judge
- 10-

Peuler in her minute entry of August 6, 1999. (R-312) and judgment of September 1, 1999. (R77) The discovery and pleadings continued beyond September 1, 1999. Under URCP Rule
52(a) summary judgment should not be granted if discovery is incomplete since information
sought in discovery may create genuine issues of material fact sufficient to defeat the motion.
Downtown Athletic Club v. Ho/wan (Utah 1987) 740 P.2d 275, 278.
Since no summary judgment has issued on the factual issues in this lawsuit, the
minute entry of August 6, 1999 and the judgment of September 1, 1999 is not applicable to the
issue of material facts that would support summary judgment.
Defendants' claim that the deposition of Bonnie Kaufman was conducted in a
related lawsuit and therefore was not part of the record. These lawsuits include the same parties,
and involve the rights of litigants to the estates of Obed and Ellen. Both plaintiffs and defendants
have elicited testimony for both cases in depositions irrespective of the case designation under
which a deposition may have been noticed. There have been no objections by any of these parties
to this practice The original certified copies of these depositions will be lodged with the court
after all briefs are completed.
All facts stated in plaintiffs' opening brief are fully reference to the page number
and line in the applicable deposition Plaintiffs defer to the appellate court to determine if any of
these facts, "mischaracterize statements or take statements out of context."

10.0 DEFENDANTS' PERSONAL ATTACK ON ATTORNEY DON
HAYCOCK IS FRIVOLOUS
Defendants' contends that the word "conspired" in Haycock's representation of
- 11 -

the court's ruling of April 20, 2000 was not part of the ruling made by the court in its oral
pronouncement of summary judgment to the companion case. Haycock has explained to the
court that the transcript of the oral proceedings was received after plaintiffs' opening brief was
served. And that the word "conspiracy" was mistakenly concluded from Haycock's handwritten
notes taken while Judge Wilkinson was dictating the ruling in open court. Haycock has
apologized to the court for this error. However, Judge Wilkinson has not yet issued an order and
Haycock has petition this court to include word "conspiracy" as Haycock believes is proved by
the facts. The undisputed facts are irrefutable that Bonnie Kaufman, Ellen Haycock and Narrvel
Hall did conspire to "cover-up" or hide from the children of Obed Haycock the fact that Obed and
Ellen Haycock executed and notarized a tenancy-in-common deed in order that Ellen could
clandestinely take title to their residence as a surviving joint tenant under a prior joint tenancy
deed. Narrvel Hall prepared the necessary documents to accomplish this. Civil conspiracy is
defined as follows:
"The essence of civil conspiracy is a concerted action or combination to
defraud or cause other injury to person or property, and which results in damages
to the person or property of the plaintiff. Connors v. Bryce 170 N.Y.S. 94, 95.
In defense of this accusation Haycock has filed with the State Bar of Utah the
charge of misconduct against Narrvel Hall for engaging in this conduct while employed by the
personal representative of Obed's estate, Ralph Haycock. This charge is Addendum No. 4. It
was filed and is offered in this brief solely in defense of Defendants' frivolous personal attack.

11.0

NARRVEL HALL'S TESTIMONY IS NOT CREDITABLE AND
BIASED AGAINST PLAINTIFFS

- 12-

Defendants' contentions that Obed was agreeable for Ellen to disinherit his
children are based on the testimony of Narrvel Hall from his alleged conversations with Obed and
Ellen in preparation of their Restated Trust Agreements and Wills (Addendum No 3 and R-198),
and, the meeting of April 5, 1983 when they signed these documents He contends that Obed and
Ellen were told to destroy the "Memorandum" and Wills sent to them from Don Haycock in
February 1983 Also, that Obed and Ellen rejected the concept of contractually obligating their
estates to treat all of their combined children equally These assertions of Hall are based on a
letter Hall wrote on February 9, 1984 in response to the "Memorandum" and Wills prepared by
Don Haycock that Ellen sent him in February 1984 (R-309)
A month later, in February 1984, Hall, in concert with Ellen and Bonnie
clandestinely secreted from the personal representative of Obed's estate, and all of Obed's other
children, the fact that Obed and Ellen had taken title to their residence as tenants-in-common via
an unrecorded tenancy-in-common deed

Also, in concert with Bonnie and Ellen, Narrvel Hall

arranged for Obed and Ellen's residence to be transferred to Ellen via by a prior joint tenancy
deed The fact that this deed was not recorded does not excuse this conduct Hall was the
attorney for Obed's estate and this conduct violated multiple ethical standards of professional
conduct Hall had an ethical obligation as an attorney to disclose to the personal representative of
Obed's estate, this tenancy-in-common deed, this cover-up and this transfer of the residence to
Ellen He did not do this and the recorded joint tenancy deed was discovered in 1998 (see
Addendum No 4)

- 13 -

12.0 NARRVEL HALL'S TESTIMONY IS REFUTED BY THE
DEPOSITION TESTIMONY OF OBED'S PERSONAL
REPRESENTATIVE RALPH HAYCOCK
Regarding Obed and Ellen's Restated Trust Agreements of April 5, 1983
(Addendum No 3 and R-198) and the meeting on this date when Obed and Ellen signed their
Restated Trust Agreements and Wills, Ralph Haycock responded as follows to the following
questions in his deposition (Addendum No 2)
Question

You are also, as I believe, the alternative trustee for the trust of
Ellen Haycock of that same date [April 5, 1983}

Answer

That's right

Question

To refresh your memory, do you recall that the trust[s] provide that
the assets of the last to die shall be distributed equally to Ellen
Haycock's children and Obed Haycock's children

Answer

That's correct

Question

Do you recall that, if this was the intention of your father, Obed
Haycock?

Answer

Yes, that was his intention

Question

Do (sic) you have any conversation with him regarding this?

Answer

Yes

Question

Do you recall specific conversations?

Answer

Before his death, during the summer of 1983,1 spent considerable
amount of time with Obed, my father, and it was his position that
his estate was set up so that when he died, certain things would go
to Ellen, certain things would be divided between his children And
the when Ellen passed away, she would reciprocate and divide the
remaining - what remains after her death would be equally divided
between the children, all the children, including the Haycock

-14-

children and her children "
Question

Do you recall any occasions when Ellen was present when this
subject was brought up?

Answer

In the - when we signed the will on that date -

Question
Answer

That date, you are referring to April April the 5th, he - they both expressed that that's what they wanted
to do That they both mentioned that, "yes, this is what we want to
do"

Question

And who was in the meeting at that time?

Answer

Well, as I recall, I was there and Narrvel Hall was there, Obed and
Ellen, and I think Bonnie [Bonnie Kaufman] was there, but I'm not
sure I can't remember, but I thought she was present also

Question

Did either of them place any limitation on this intention?

Answer

No
Mr Payne

Objection, vague

Question

okay, when this intention was expressed, was it expressed before
Narrvel Hall

Answer

Yes

Question

Do you remember any words that Obed may have spoken at that
time?

Answer

It's been 16 years ago All I remember is they expressed their
intent to do that, both of them did The words they used, it's been
to long ago to remember the exact words

Question

Did Ellen Haycock say anything to the effect that she would
disinherit Obed's children if any mistreated her?

Answer

No, that was not mentioned

Ralph Haycock's recollection of Obed's intention is stated in a letter he sent to
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Ellen on December 28, 1983, three weeks after Obed's death, that states the following"The truth Ellen is that my father really did care The part that you refuse to
suggest or even acknowledge is that you and my father made a secret covenant in the
presence of Narrvel Hall In this covenant each of you promised that the wealth that was
accumulated between the two of you, individually and collectively, at the time of death,
would go to the surviving spouse The surviving spouse would in turn promise to leave
what wealth was left over at his/her death to the six children [Obed's children and Bonnie
Kaufman] " (Bonnie Kaufman's Deposition at 32/4 to 35/5)
Ralph Haycock's testimony factually contradicts Narrvel Hall's testimony that
"Obed stated he was satisfied with an arrangement which protected only the residue of his own
assets for the children

" And that "

they both made it very clear that, while, Ellen fully

intended to treat her daughter Bonnie and Obed's children equally, her assets were her own and
she was not to be under any legal disability with respect to their use, management or disposition
(Underlining added) (R-310)
There is no dispute that the "Memorandum" does not limit Ellen's use or
management of the funds in her estate - it only limits her right to disinherit Obed's children
Ralph Haycock's testimony directly contradicts Hall's testimony in this regard and supports Obed
signing and retention of the "Memorandum" to ensure that Ellen would comply with their
undisputed intention that it expressed when she died Obed's intention is not disputable because
he did not change his testamentary plan to disinherit Bonnie and his intention is clearly that he did
not want to favor Bonnie over his own children as Hall implies he did (R- 287)
Hall has not produced any evidence of what "contractual relationship" was
discussed with Obed and Ellen Only that it was "somewhat similar to that proposed by Don "
Hall did not know what Don Haycock had presented at the time this alleged "contractual
relationship" was discussed

According to Hall, Obed's concern was - not the distribution of
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Ellen's estate - but that the children not interfere with the property she received from Obed
during her lifetime There is no indication in Hall's letter (R-309) that Obed is withdrawing from
his and Ellen's intention that their estates shall go to all of their children equally
When Obed signed the "Memorandum" he formalized this oral agreement between
him and Ellen by offering her a unilateral contract that if she would treat all their children equally
in her estate, he would do the same A unilateral contract is one in which a promise is given in
exchange for some act, forbearance or thing An offer to enter into a unilateral contract does not
require notice of acceptance, it is the act that constitutes acceptance Restatement of Contracts,
chapter 12, 1 Corbm 21; Wilhston 3rd. section 13. Consideration to a unilateral contract may be
a benefit conferred on a third person Cechetti v. Consumers Associates (Cal 1968) 260 CA 2d
295, 298 When a contract is unilateral and has been fully performed by the one of the parties, the
remaining promise is taken out of the Statute of Frauds and may be enforced against the other
party Blaustem v.Barton (Cal 1970) 9 CA 3d 161, 185

13.0

OBED HAYCOCK DID NOT DESTROY THE "MEMORANDUM"
AND WITH IT INTENDED TO ENFORCE ITS TERMS THAT ALL
CHILDREN BE TREATED EQUALLY.

Defendants cite the several times Narrvel Hall allegedly told Obed to destroy the
"Memorandum" and conclude he must have destroyed it There is no poof that he destroyed it
and the only reasonably inference is that he did not destroy it It was most likely acquired by
Ellen and Bonnie when they removed items from his safety deposit box in advance of Obed's
personal representative R-223 The scenario on which Defendants rely to advance this
-17-

destruction theory is as follows:
(1). On March 15, 1983 Obed, Ellen, Narrvel Hall and Senior Partner Albert
Bowen met to discuss Obed and Ellen's estate plan. During this meeting there was a discussion
about a document (incorrectly identified as a will) Obed signed about a month previously, that his
son Don Haycock had prepared. Narrvel Hall told Obed and Ellen to destroy this document as
soon as they got home. (Addendum No. 6)
(2). On April 5, 1983 after Narvell Hall had prepared Obed and Ellen's trusts and
wills, Obed again informed Narrvel Hall that he had signed a document prepared by Don. R- 309
The implication of this evidence is that Obed had not followed Hall's instructions
of March 15, 1999 to destroy the 'Memorandum" nor is there any proof he followed Hall's
instructions of April 5, 1983.
Narrvel Hall does not know if Obed and Ellen destroyed the "Memorandum" that
Obed signed.
Narrvel Hall contradicts the testimony of Ralph Haycock by asserting that in his
conversation with Obed and Ellen ". . . their instructions [to him] were that the survivor would
have the right to disinherit their children for any reason at all as to the assets of that individual."
(Addendum No. 7 page 27)

Narrvel Hall recommended that they not pursue the plan of a "joint

and contractual plan of disposition." (Addendum No. 7, pages 29 -30) In 1979 Obed's intention
that all children be treated equally was expressed in his will of June 28, 1979 by the following
provision:
"[If] Trustor's wife [Ellen] has preferred the living descendants of Trustor's wife
over the living descendants of Trustor or has preferred one of Trustor's living descendants
over one of Trustor's other living descendants, then Trustee shall divide the remaining
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trust estate into as many equal shares as the sum of (i) the number of Trustor's the living
children and (ii) the number of Trustor's deceased children who have living descendants "
(R-297)
It was not only Obed's intention that all children be treated equally, but he
expressed this in writings that he has signed Defendants have offered no evidence that these
writings were ever revoked by him
Plaintiffs' have met their burden of proof and the burden now shifts to defendants
to refute this proof- which they have failed to do It is relevant that Ellen and Bonnie invaded
Obed's safety deposit box before his personal representative could inventory the contents (R223) Had Obed destroyed the "Memorandum" Defendants would know, but they remain silent
Hall made no effort to have Obed and Ellen produce the "Memorandum" so that
he could assess its legal effect In his depositions he claims that he assumes it was a will that
Obed signed and the Restated Trust and Will Obed signed on April 5, 1983 would invalidate it
Obed knew that he had signed the "Memorandum" and knew it was not a will Both Bonnie and
Hall have testified that he was mentally competent at the time he signed these documents on April
5, 1983 Obed also knew that the terms of the "Memorandum" were precisely incorporated into
the Restate Trust Agreement he signed on this date - and that neither the trust or will he signed
on this date would invalidate this "Memorandum " Ellen was also present at the March 15, 1983
meeting and the April 5, 1983 meeting when Obed's signing of the "Memorandum" was
discussed

The legal significance of the "Memorandum" had been explained to her and Obed by

Attorney Hal Swenson before the March 15, 1983 meeting with Hal and Bowen With this
knowledge, she did not give it to Hall, nor did Obed, for formal rejection
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14.0 DEFENDANTS' RELIANCE ON JACKSON V. JACKSON IS NOT
APPLICABLE
Defendants' cite Jackson v. Jackson in support of the contention that the Statute
of Frauds in effect in California in 1953 barred an inheritance under an oral contract (page 14)
However, the Statute of Frauds cited in Jackson was revoked in both California and Utah in the
1980's Utah replaced it with Utah Probate Code, sections 75-2-701 & 75-2-514 and California
also adopted the same provisions in their Probate Code (see Plaintiffs' opening brief))

15.0 DEFENDANT'S RELIANCE ON GONZALEZ V. SATRUSTEGUIIS
NOT APPLICABLE
Defendants cite Gonzalez v. Satrustegui in support of the contention that the
Statute of Frauds will be enforced if applicable (page 15) This is an Arizona case that has ruled
on the applications of two Arizona statutes having to do with execution of wills Plaintiffs are
unable to find and reference to the Arizona Statute of Frauds, or what this statute expresses and
Defendants' did not include any reference in their responding briefs

16.0 DEFENDANT'S RELIANCE IN ESTATE OFSOMOGYI V.
MAROSITES IS NOT APPLICABLE.
Defendants incorrectly cites Estate ofSomogyi v. Marosites, a Florida case in
support of the contention that a court will grant judgment on the pleadings where the complaint
did not allege a written agreement to make a will (page 15) This case holds that where a
husband and wife reduce an oral agreement to make reciprocal wills to a writing and then reduce
-20-

this agreement to one mutual will signed by both, it will be enforced over a subsequent will made
by one of the parties revoking the joint will.

17.0

DEFENDANT'S RELIANCE ON DICKIE V. DICKIE IS NOT
APPLICABLE

Defendants incorrectly cite Dickie v. Dickie, an Oregon case, for the alleged
proposition that, " the reference to "decedent" in an Oregon statute of fraud provision, is intended
to apply to the person against whom the agreement to make a will or devise is sought to enforce."
(page 16) In this case a father and son entered into a contract that in consideration for the son's
transfer to the father of his one-quarter remainder interest in a piece of real estate, in which the
father held a life estate, the father agreed to leave that real estate to the son in his will.
Sebsequently the father conveyed his interest to a third party The court held that there was a
valid contract between the son and father, and the father breached the contract by selling the real
estate during his lifetime. This issue was whether the father can be held in breach for an inter
vivos transfer. The court held he could and it was not necessary for him to be a "decedent."
This case has no application to California Probate Code, sections 75-2-701 & 75-2-514.

18.0 OBED RELIED ON ELLEN'S REPRESENTATIONS AND ACTS
THAT SHE WOULD NOT DISINHERIT HIS CHILDREN
During the latter years of Obed's life, Ellen have no indication to him that she
would not honor their intention, that turned into a unilateral contract and then a bilateral contract.
She knew the legal effect of the "Memorandum" that he signed (R-105) and was troubled that by
-21 -

the terms of this "Memorandum" she would have to share her estate with his children as Attorney
Hal Swenson had explained to her So she went to an old friend, Albert Bowen of Ray, Quinney
& Nebeker in an effort to kill the legal effect of this "Memorandum " She persuaded them to
incorporate the testamentary plan expressed in the "Memorandum" into hers and Obed's Trusts minus the contractual obligations since she knew Obed was dying (see Opening Brief) and would
not make any changes
She knew that the references Hall made to the "Memorandum" as a
"planning"document, or will, or codicil were false, but she did not identify to him what this
document really was and did, as she had been told by Attorney Swenson If Obed had really
changed his mind about her having the right to disinherit his children - she would have given this
"Memorandum" to Narrvel Hall for formal destruction She chose not to because it was not
Obed's intention to disinherit his children

19.0 DEFENDANTS MISREPRESENT OBED AND ELLEN'S
FINANCIAL STATUS
Defendants represent that both Obed and Ellen had their own assets and each was
free to dispose of them as they wished (page 21) The implication of this representation was that
Ellen had assets apart from what Obed gave her The facts are that other than Ellen's
contribution to their residence, her assets came from Obed Although irrelevant to the issues
before this court, this assertion falsely characterizes the financial contributions each of these
parties brought to the marriage Addendum No 8 is a letter from Ray, Quinney & Nebeker that
defines these parties financial status in 1979 At this time Ellen's estate was one-half of her
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interest in their residence which was then held in joint tenancy. This letter is included only to
correct this misrepresentation.

20.0 CONCLUSION
Contrary to Defendants' responding brief, there was a contractual relationship
between Obed and Ellen at the time of his death in 1983. The "Memorandum" he signed in
February 1983, or thereabouts, both affirmed his intention that all children be treated equally in
each of their estate the he first expressed in his will of 1979, and memorialize in writing a
unilateral offer to Ellen that in consideration for his commitment to this disposition of his assets,
she would do the same Up until his death, this was a unilateral contract wherein a promise was
exchanged first for an act by Ellen to execute the Restated Trust Agreement Hall prepared for her
in 1983, and then forbearance not to revoke that agreement, which she did a year later. Upon
Obed's death this unilateral contract became a bilateral contract. Obed had fully performed his
promise. A unilateral contact that has become fully performed on one side becomes a bilateral
contract. (Where the contract in unilateral has been fully performed by one party, the remaining
promise is taken out of the statute of frauds, and the party who performed may enforce it against
the other. Restatement of Contract, Sec. 198; 2 Cor bin, Sec. 457 & 458; 3 Williston 3d. Sec.
504; A.L.R.2d. 1053; 49 A.LR2d. 1293,1296) That this offer was repeatedly communicated to
Ellen cannot be disputed. Obed's signing of his Restated Trust Agreement and Will in 1983
cannot be a revocation of this offer - it is rather another written confirmation of this offer.
Defendants' arguments fail that Equitable Estoppel and Promissory Estoppel are
not applicable because they are based on there being no contractual relationship.
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As third party beneficiaries of this contract, Plaintiffs are entitled to enforce this
contract both against the Estate of Ellen Haycock and her personal representative, Defendant
Bonnie Kaufman.
Whether, or not, Obed expressed to Narrvel Hall that Ellen was at liberty to
dispose of her estate in any manner she desired, as Hall claims, or whether there was an
unconditional commitment to Obed that she honor the terms of their Restated Trust Agreements
of April 5, 1983 as Ralph Haycock has testified - is a factual issue.
Respectfully submitted,

Don H. Haycock, Attorney pro hac vice
for Plaintiff, and in pro se
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JENSEN v. IHC HOSPITALS, INC.

Utah

Cite as 944 P.2d 327 (Utah 1997)

1. Statutes *»188,223.2(.5), 223.4
Sherry JENSEN and Shayne Hipwell, individually and on behalf of all other heirs
of Shelly Hipwell, and Ashley Michele
Hipwell and Kaycie Shaylene Hipwell
appearing by Shayne Hipwell as guardian ad litem, Plaintiffs, Appellants, and
Cross-Appellees,
v.
IHC HOSPITALS, INC., dba McKay-Dee
Hospital, and Michael J. Healy, M.D.
and Does I through X, Defendants, Appellees, and Cross-Appellant.
No. 950164.
Supreme Court of Utah.
April 4, 1997.
Opinion Granting Rehearing
Aug. 22, 1997.

.When faced with two statutes that^ntrr
port to cover same subject, Supreme^GoWt
determines legislature's intent as to which
statute applies by following general rules of
statutory construction, which provide both
that best evidence of legislative intent is
plain language of statute and that more specific statute governs instead of more general
statute*
2. Physicians and Surgeons e=»l8.15
Two-year statute of limitations governing medical malpractice actions covered, action by patient's family for wrongful 4eath
arising out of medical malpractice. U.CA
1953, 78-14-4.
3. Death <3=»39

Statute of limitations applicable to
wrongful
death claims arising out of medical
Keheanng Denied Sept. 25, 1997.
malpractice begin to run at time patient or
plaintiff discovers or, through use of reasonPatient's family sued physician and hos- able diligence should have discovered the
pu! for wrongful death arising out of medi- injury, whichever first occurs. U.CA1953,
r%\ malpractice. The Third District Court, 78-14-4.
(
«va)t Lake Division I, Glenn Iwasaki, J.,
fronted summary judgment for defendants 4. Death ®=>39
* limitations grounds. Family appealed.
Absent any reason to toll two-year statTV Supreme Court, Zimmerman, C.J., held ute of limitations governing deceased pa»hat (1) wrongful death claims were gov- tient's medical malpractice claims, patient's
rmei\ by two-year statute of limitations for family could not bring survival claim, where
**<<iieal malpractice actions; (2) limitations statute had run by time patient died. U.C A*
HTHKI began running when plaintiffs discov1953, 78-11-12; 78-1&-37, 78-14-4.•
er*!, or should have discovered, underlying
njun, (3) genuine issue of fact as to wheth- 5. Judgment «=»181(7)
er ph>Mcian's fraudulent concealment tolled
Genuine issue of fact as to wneuier pny•utute of limitations precluded summary sician's alleged fraudulent concealment prejudgment; (4) patient's children were not vented patient's family .from inquiring into
rtiiitJtHl to bring wrongful death claim suchpossibility of medical malpractice on part of .
tX*t they were not entitled to provisions of physician and hospital precluded suitunfity
v*hng statute; on motion for rehearing; (5) judgment in favor of physician and hospital ,
fwsuine issues of fact existed as to whether
on statute of liimtaU6r^' grotnidsinvfei^y'^
Oman's alleged fraudulent concealment
wrongful death action arising out rf medical
*XJM be impute to hospital so as to toll
malpractice. U,CJLlfik,?W4-4 °JT< *, Stations period on claim against hospital;
•d ft) family did not present evidence to 6. Death <s=»39 !' " ' '• d ' r'pf Tx ''*""* '<<?
*rp»rt constructive fraud claim against hosDeceased patient'^ Jtyinor children werp
**1 and thus such a claim could not toll
not
entitled to faring \M^IOA T^ri^^^K^
ksaitions period.
death because patient k}$ipjtyrA
» - **»
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and ian at time of her deajh, micK
**wded.
statute did not prevent statufe o ^ L _

jfeNSEN v. IHC HOSPITALS, INC.

Utah

Cite •• 944 P.2d 327 (Utah 1997)

Inst, 782 P.2d 506, 509, 511-12 (Utah 1989)
frejecting attempts to recast claim for dAmures arising out of regulators' licensing decision as claim for negligence to avoid govern^ntal immunity).
In conclusion, we hold that Shelly's family's wrongful death claims are governed by
the two-year statute of limitations for medical malpractice actions contained in section
Tg-14-4 of the Utah Code. We further conclude that the limitations period starts runmng when the patient or plaintiff discovers,
or through the exercise of due diligence
<bou!d have discovered, the underlying injury
IM\ its origins in medical malpractice. We
rvmand this case for a factual finding as to
* hither Shelly's family's claims of fraudulent
concealment will toll the statute of limitations
AH to their wrongful death and survival
claims We hold that the deceased's children
A,n» not entitled to bring a wrongful death
'.urn because their mother had a guardian
4|»|M>mted at the time of her death and thus
•V children were not entitled to the provisos of the tolling statute. Finally, we hold
that Shelly's family's claims for common law
fraud are also governed by the two-year
nulled malpractice statute of limitations
'mind in section 78-14-4 and decline to reach
•l)i lr claims of the unconstitutionality of this
*V,Kling of the statute.

We address wheiher we should upHold'&i
mary ' judgment" Ifi i^or
'WVA&^SL^
u
McKay-Dee' H o 8 p f ^ ' ( ^ c ^ l ) ^ c W
cause ^plaintiffs Shayne_ Hij>Well* Sto4 Sftefrj^
Jensen's wrongful death 'action.Jla^unslr
McKay-Dee was'barred by the meaicaf ttialpractice statute o{% limitations, 4[&ee^ tftsuV
Code Ann. § 78-14-4. ( In our^ prior opinidn^
in this case, we reversed, th€| [trial "court's J
grant of summary judgment as w^al^ defen^
dants and remanded on the is§ue oriwhether,)
defendant Michael J. Healy's ("Dr. Healy")'
alleged fraud in collaborating with plaintiffs*
original attorney was sufficient to toll the.
statute of limitations on their medical malpractice claims once they had retained an
independent attorney. Jensen v. IHC
Hosps., Inc., 944 P.2d 327, 337 (1997). We
further held that Jensen and HipwelTs attempt to recharacterize tneir medical malpractice; wrongful death claim as a claim for
fraud was not sufficient to avoid the twoyear medical malpractice statute of limitations. Id at 337. In its petition for rehearing, McKay-Dee now claims that summary
judgment in its favor should have been upheld because (i) Dr. Healy^ fraud does not
toll the statute of limitations as to Jensen
and Hipwell's claims against McKay-Dee;
and (ii) Jensen and HipwelTs allegations of
fraud oh the part of McKay-Dee were properly dismissed by the trial court.

RISSON, HOWE, EVES, and
H U.LIDAY, JJ., concur in Chief Justice
ZIMMERMAN'S opinion.

We begin with a brief review of tbtf faets
relevant to our decision on'rehearing Be-*
cause we are reviewing a grantxrfsttfhmary
Having disqualified themselves, Associate
judgment, we view the facts in the light1 most
<"hicf Justice STEWART and Justice
favorable to the nonmoving parties, Jensen
OI'RHAM do not participate herein; District and Hipwell. Id at 328. Jensen and Hips
Jodjre J. PHILLIP EVES and District
well allege that Dr. Healy, Who ha#<*rtAff
Judge BRUCE K. HALLIDAY sat.
privileges at McKay-Defc but was u&'&tfff
On Petition for Rehearing
ployed by McKay-Dee, coimnitted^na^racv
/
This court now grants rehearing and issues tice on Shelly HipwBU'<Jeh^*8 dat^tw
tiu* opinion without hearing oral argument. and HipwelTs wtfe), while shp l^^jutieo^At
*luh 1988), State v Amicone, 689 P 2d 1341,
H44(Ulah 1984)
*t uc recently noted in Monson v. Carver, we
**\ rrfuse to address a claim of unconstifution*ht\ uhere the party making the claim has failed
» make the requisite showing to support the
<tom 928 P.2d 1017, 1024 (Utah 1996). *' '[A]
ftvxwing court is entitled to have the issues
cW»H\ defined with pertinent authority cited and
* fwt simply a depository in which the appealing

party may dump the ourden of arj^merft a M
research/" Id. (quoting Butter, 90^-JP.iW at
230-31) (additional xjtations omitte4).\ ^ t h i s
case, as in Monson, we are particularly J o ^ Jo
•address a claim of, unconsuUitionatfty <rf a «1*tutt
where the outcome wotJd'tritkally depm^.^ii
factual research?} into thft effetaven^sVofflwtfe
differing* statutes of limitations in furthering She
legislature's purported goals.,*^ / **/'R?1?^$&%*

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
* * *

IN THE MATTER OF THE
ESTATE OF

Civil No. P83-1229
Deposition of:

Obed Crosby Haycock,

RALPH H. HAYCOCK

Deceased.

Judge Leslie A. Lewis
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P R O C E E D I N G S

2

RALPH H. HAYCOCK,

3

called as a witness, having first been

4

duly sworn, was examined and testified

5

as follows:

6
7
8
9

EXAMINATION
PY MRt HAYCOCK:
Q

Mr. Haycock, you have talked to your attorney

about this deposition today?

10

A

Yes.

11

Q

Do you understand what a deposition is?

12

A

Yes.

13

Q

You have been deposed in the past?

14

A

Yes.

15

Q

You understand that I'm going to be asking you

16

questions, and the oath you have you just took requires

17

you to tell the truth, the whole truth.

18

understand that?

Do you

19

A

Yes.

20

Q

Is there any reason why we can't proceed with

21

this deposition today?

22

A

No.

23

Q

Are you on any medication?

24

A

No.

25

Q

Do you have any questions about this

1

depo sition?

2

A

No.

3

Q

You are the trustee of the Obed C. Haycock

4

Trust of April 5, 1983; is that correct?

5

A

That 's correct.
«

6

Q

You are also, as I believe, the alternate trust

7

for the trust of :Ellen Haycock of that same date?

8

A

That 's :right.

9

Q

Are you familiar with these trusts5?

10

A

Now the trust that she originally signed on

11
12
13

that date, but not her current trust.
Q

That's what I'm talking about, the trust of

that date, of April 5, 1983.

14

A

That trust I am listed as an alternate,

15

Q

Those trusts, could you tell us what the

16

distribution of these parties' assets was to be after the

17

death of the survivor?

18

A

I would have to look it up.

19

the tip of my tongue.

20

to look it up.

21

Q

I don't have it on

I don't know that.

I would have

To refresh your memory, do you recall that the

22

trust provides that the estate of the last to die shall

23

be distributed equally to Ellen Haycock's children and

24

Obed Haycock's children?

25

A

That's correct.

1

Q

That's what it states?

2

A

That's right.

3

Q

Do you recall that, if this was the intention

4

of your father, Obed Haycock?

5

A

Yes, that was his intention.

6

Q

Do you have any conversations with him

7

regarding this?

8

A

Yes.

9

Q

Do you recall specific conversations?

10

A

Before his death, during the summer of 1983, I

11

spent considerable amount of time with Obed, my father,

12

and it was his position that his estate was set up so

13

that when he died, certain things would go to Ellen,

14

certain things would be divided between his children.

15

And then when Ellen passed away, she would reciprocate

16

and divide then the remaining—what remains after her

17

death would be equally divided between the children, all

18

the children, including the Haycock children and her

19

children.

20

Q

And he expressed that that was his intention?

21

A

That was his intention, yes.

22

Q

Do you recall any occasions when Ellen was

23

present when this subject was brought up?

24

A

In the—when we signed the will on that date—

25

Q

That date, you are referring to April—

1

A

April the 5th of 1983, he—they both expressed

2

that that's what they wanted to do.

3

mentioned that, MYes, this is what we want to do."

4

Q

Do you remember specifically the words they

6

A

No, I don't.

7

intention.

8

Q

And who was in the meeting at that time?

9

A

Well, as I recall, I was there and Narrvel Hall

5

1

That they both

used?
They expressed that as their

10

was there, Obed and Ellen, and I think Bonnie was there,

11

but I'm not sure.

12

was present also.

13

Q

14

intention?

15

A

16
17

I can't remember, but I thought she

Did either of them place any limitation on this

No.
MR. PAYNE:

Q

Objection; vague.

(BY MR. HAYCOCK)

Did either of them express

18

any limitation on the intention that the survivor would

19

distribute his or her estate equally to her children and

20

his children?

21

A

By—what do you mean by conditions?

22

Q

Well, limitations.

23

A

Or limitations.

24

Q

Okay, when this intention was expressed, was it

25

I don't understand what that—

expressed before Narrvel Hall?

1

A

Yes.

2

Q

Do you remember any words that Obed may have

3

spoken at that time?

4

A

It's been 16 years ago.

All I remember is they

5

expressed their intent to do that, both of them did.

6

words they used, it's been too long ago to remember the

7

exact words.

8

Q

9
10
11

The

Did they express that this was their intent,

and did either of them say, "But maybe something will
happen that we won't be able to do it"?
A

So what—what you are saying is that, if I

12

understand your question, is they are saying, "This is

13

our intent; however, if the children don't behave

14

properly, you don't have to share with them"?

15

Q

Yes, was that expressed?

16

A

No, that was not expressed.

17

Q

Was there any reference at all to the conduct

18

of the children—

19

A

Yes.

20

Q

—toward either one of them?

21

A

Yes, there was.

The issue came up, and I don't

22

remember who mentioned it, that Dad had considered

23

disinheriting Don Haycock.

24

pondered that but said nothing, and I definitely remember

25

that.

That was mentioned.

Dad

8

1

Q

Was there anything else mentioned?

2

A

No, I can't remember anything else of that

3

nature, no*

4

Q

Did Ellen Haycock say anything to the effect

5

that she would disinherit Obed's children if any

6

mistreated her?

7

A

No, that was not mentioned.

8

Q

When you came in to this meeting, did you come

9

in with Ellen and Obed?

10

A

11

there.

12

them there.

13

don't believe I rode down with them.

14

met them there at a certain time.

15

That's interesting.

I don't remember how I got

All I remember is I was there.

Q

I may have met them.

I may have met

I think I did.

I

I think I must have

Following this meeting, did you have any

16

communications or conversations with Narrvel Hall

17

regarding this intention that was expressed in this

18

meeting?

19

A

No, not before this meeting.

20

Q

After this meeting?

21

A

After this meeting, I asked Narrvel a question

22

that it was my understanding that part of the will, at

23

least Dad's position was that a lot of the will was based

24

upon Ellen's trust, and that he had written it that way

25

where he absolutely wanted to leave—his first concern

1

was to take care of Ellen.

2

clear.

3

fair and share with the children.

4

that this was the best way he could do his will.

5

that he felt that Ellen would share her estate with all

6

the children, just as he has done.

7

And he—it was his feeling that Ellen would be

exactly those words.

9

used.

11

It was his feeling
And

Now, Narrvel expressed that to me, but not in

8

10

Dad made this very, very

I don't remember the words he

But he did express that to me, that they seemed to

have a mutual agreement between the two of them.
Q

Did Narrvel say to you, if you recall, that

12

there was any—that Ellen was free to disinherit any

13

children that mistreated her?

14
15

A

I don't recall Narrvel Hall telling me that.

No, I don't recall that with Narrvel Hall, no.

16

Q

17

took place?

18

A

19
20
21

Was Bonnie Kaufman there when this discussion

No, she was not there.

Narrvel Hall and I were

alone when that discussion took place.
Q

Did you have any subsequent discussions with

Narrvel Hall?

22

A

I had a lot of discussions with him.

23

Q

Let me rephrase that.

24
25

After Ellen disinherited Obed's children, did
J you have any discussions with Narrvel Hall regarding that
10

1
2
3
4
5

subject?
A

I had none.

Today is the first time I have

seen Narrvel Hall since back in 1984.
Q

Did you have any discussions with Ellen after

you learned that she had disinherited Obed's children?

6

A

No, I didn't.

7

with Ellen.

8

Q

9

her on this?

I don't recall discussing this

Did you intend to ever have a discussion with

10

A

I had thought about it a lot, but I never did.

11

Q

Why didn't you talk to her?

12

A

Well, I wasn't sure what I would say.

13

Q

During this meeting of April 5, 1983 with

14

Mr. Hall, was the subject of the wills and the memorandum

15

that Don Haycock prepared—

16

A

The meeting of '83?

17

Q

The meeting where you signed these wills.

18
19

Or

where these trusts—
A

20

Where I signed them, was that discussed?
MR. PAYNE:

Just for clarification, the

21

question was where you signed the wills, did you sign

22

wills, those wills in 1983?

23
24
25

THE WITNESS:

The ones I signed were the

revised.
Q

(BY MR. HAYCOCK)

Restated?
11
11

1
2

A
1983.

3
4

MR. PAYNE:

THE WITNESS:

MR. DEAMER:

I think you mean the restated

trust agreement.

9
10

He signed them and I signed

them.

7
8

Did you sign those personally or

did your father and—

5
6

The restated wills in 1983, April the 5th#

THE WITNESS:

The restated trust agreement,

yes.

11

Now, your question was was your documents

12

discussed at that time?

13

think they were.

14

were discussed at that time.

15

Q

I can't remember.

But I don't

It doesn't stick in my mind that they

(BY MR. HAYCOCK)

Have you ever had any

16

discussions with Bonnie Kaufman regarding the intention

17

that the parties expressed in that meeting?

18

A

By intention, you mean to share equally?

19

Q

Yes# for this.

20

A

Yes, I have discussed that with Bonnie.

21

Q

Did Bonnie remember that discussion?

22

A

That I had with her personally?

23

Q

No, did Bonnie remember the intention that was

24

expressed in this meeting by the parties that the

25

survivor would share equally with the children of both?
12
12

1

MR. PAYNE:

Objection; lack of foundation.

2

witness has testified that he is not sure if Bonnie

3

Kaufman was present at that meeting.

4

THE WITNESS:

The

I had discussed the agreement

5

with Bonnie on several occasions, but I don't know

6

whether we discussed it or whether I asked her whether

7

she remembers discussing it in that particular time or

8

not.

9
10
11
12
13
14
15

Q

(BY MR. HAYCOCK)

What do you remember her

saying about the agreement?
A

I think she felt that that was what she

understood too.
Q

That she understood the survivor would share

equally with the children of both?
A

Well, I think—that's precisely the way those

16

trusts were written.

17

And I think she probably agreed with that too.

18

know that she ever took exception to that.

19
20

Q

They were both written that way.
I don't

Do you remember any statement she said that may

have led you to believe that she didn't believe that?

21

A

I can't—right now I can't think of anything.

22

Q

You have had several conversations with Ellen

23

after this meeting of April 5, 1983; is that true?

24

A

That's correct.

25

Q

Has Ellen ever brought the subject up?
13
13

1

A

The only thing Ellen has ever mentioned to me,

2

that she felt that Dad should have disinherited you,

3

That's the only thing she's ever mentioned.

4

very—she felt that Dad was put under an incredible

5

amount of stress.

6

Q

She was

That's the only thing she said.

She has not stated that this intention, that

7

the survivor shall make the distribution to both their

8

children equally, she never said anything about that that

9

you recall?

10

A

I can't recall.

11

what she was going to do.

12

intention.

13

Q

I always assumed that that's
I assumed that was their

Were you in attendance at a meeting on

14

Valentine's Day, 1979, it would have been February 14th,

15

1979, where Obed and Ellen were present and the estates

16

were discussed?

17

A

Valentine's Day, 1979?

I can't isolate that

18

date.

19

occasions, and I can't—it's been too long ago to isolate

20

that particular date.

21

Q

These documents were discussed on numerous

No, what I'm referring to is a meeting that

22

took place before these documents of April 5, 1983, and

23

the documents of June 28, 1979 were prepared.

24

A

I can't remember any specific meeting on that

25

time frame.
14
14

Q

When you had your discussions with Narrvel Hall

following this April 5, 1983 meeting, did he indicate to
you that he believed Ellen would honor this agreement?
MR, PAYNE:

Objection to characterization of it

as an agreement.
THE WITNESS:
he mentioned that.

No, I don't think—I don't think

I think he mentioned that it was her

intention and Dad's intentions to do this.

I don't think

he made a judgment as to whether that would happen or
not.

I can't remember him saying that.
Q

(BY MR. HAYCOCK)

From Ellen's expression to

you that Obed should have disinherited Don Haycock, did
you get the impression that she was going to live up to
the agreement or the intention?
A

Yeah, I thought she would.

I think she was

very disturbed that she—I think she loved Dad, and I
think this was a difficult thing for her.
saw him go through a lot of pain.

I think she

And I think she was

just expressing her feelings.
Q

Why do you think she didn't live up to that

intention?
A

I don't know.

Q

Do you believe that Bonnie Kaufman had anything

to do with that?
A

Well, I'm sure that Bonnie maybe played some
15
15

1

role in it, but I don't know what role.

2

Maybe the Haycock children didn't visit her enough.

3

Maybe we weren't—we didn't try hard enough to get close

4

to her.

5

Q

I don't know.

I don't know what the reasons were, Don.
Okay.

Then in one of your letters you

6

mentioned that Obed and Ellen had entered into a

7

covenant?

8
9
10
11

A

I don't remember that letter.

that letter.
Q

I don't remember

You will have to show it to me.

I have the letter.

Unfortunately, I didn't

bring it, but I can produce it.

12

My question is do you recall what you were

13

referring to?

I will represent that that is what was

14

stated in the letter as to what covenant they were

15

talking about.

16

MR. PAYNE:

17

MR. DEAMER:

18

THE WITNESS:

19

they entered into an agreement.

20

that a covenant or not, I don't—I would call it more of

21

an agreement they had with each other to share equally in

22

their estates.

23

Q

Objection; foundation.
I join in that objection.
The only thing I remember is that

(BY MR. HAYCOCK)

Whether you would call

On another subject, you were

24

to produce certain documents at this deposition.

25

bring them?

Did you

16
16
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1

same method of conforming that appeared on the

2

prior document.

3

Q

All right.

I 1 11 hand you what's been

4

marked as Exhibit No. 5 and ask if you can identify

5

that document for us.

6

A

Yes,

This appears to be the amended

7

and restated trust document, at least a copy of the

8

amended and restated trust document, executed by

9

Ellen S. Haycock on April 5, 1983.

And again, it

10

appears to be a copy made from our conformed file

11

copy of that document.

12

Q

All right.

13

marked as Exhibit No. 6.

14

document?

15

A

I do.

Let me hand you what's been
Do you recognize that

That appears to be a copy of our

16

conformed file copy of the will executed by Ellen

17

S. Haycock on April 5th of 1983.

18

Q

All right.

Let me hand you now what's

19

been marked as Exhibit 7.

20

document?

21

A

I do.

Do you recognize that

This appears to be a copy of a

22

letter which I wrote to Ralph H. Haycock on

23

February 9, 1984.

24
25

Q

Okay.

I f ll represent to you that this

is a copy of that letter that I received from

SUSETTE M. SNIDER
18
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AMENDED AND RESTATED

Ellen S. Haycockr a resident of Salt Lake County, State of
Utah, hereinafter referred to as "Trustor", and Ralph Hugh Haycock
and Bonnie Lou L. Kaufman, hereinafter referred to as "Trustee",
hereby enter into this Amended and Restated Trust Agreement
this J£L d a v o f f?tr»s,\Jl
, 1983, amending in its entirety that
certain Trust Agreement between Trustor and Ralph Hugh Haycock, as
Trustee dated the 28th day of June, 1979, for the benefit of
Trustor for life and then for the benefit of Trustor's "Children"
and "Descendants", as defined in Sections 6.1 and 6.2 below.
I.

CREATION OF TRUST - PROPERTIES

$1.1 Transfer of Property to Trust. Trustor hereby creates
this trust and transfers to Trustee the sum of twenty-five dollars
($25.00) to be administered by Trustee pursuant to the provisions
hereof.
$1.2 Additional Transfers to Trust. Trustor or any other
person may make additional contributions of cash or property to
this trust by inter vivos transfer or by will and such
contributions shall be held and administered by Trustee pursuant
to the provisions hereof.
$1.3 Insurance. Trustor may cause Trustee to be named
beneficiary of policies of insurance on the life of Trustor. All
proceeds from insurance received by Trustee shall be administered
by Trustee in accordance with the provisions hereof.
II.

PROVISIONS APPLICABLE DURING TRUSTOR'S LIFE

$2.1 Trustor Directs Distributions. During Trustor's life,
Trustee shall distribute to Trustor such part or all of the
income, retained income and principal of the trust estate as
Trustor directs in writing. All income not distributed pursuant
to such directions of Trustor shall be reinvested by Trustee.
$2.2 Trustor May Alter, Amend or Revoke. Trustor shall have
the right from time to time during Trustor's life, by a document
in writing delivered to Trustee, to alter, amend or revoke this
trust either in whole or in part. Nevertheless, the interests of
all beneficiaries shall vest at date hereof and shall remain
vested until such time as Trustor alters, amends or revokes such
interests in such manner. Upon any revocation Trustee shall
distribute the trust estate pursuant to the written directions of
Trustor. Neither Trustor nor any person on behalf of Trustor may
alter, amend or revoke this trust in whole or in part, after
Trustor's death, or during any incompetency of Trustor.
$2.3 Benefits in Event of Incapacity. During any period with
respect to which Trustor is determined to be unable to manage
properly Trustor's own affairs, Trustee shall have discretion to
the income and principal as Trustee determines is reasonably
necessary or appropriate for Trustor's support, maintenance or
benefit, and/or for the support, education or maintenance of any
person to the extent dependent upon Trustor.
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§2.4 Trustor Directs Investments. So long as Trustor lives
and has capacity to do so, Trustor shall have the right to direct
the investment of the trust estate by a written instrument
delivered to Trustee. Trustee shall sell such properties which
are part of the trust estate as directed by Trustor and shall
reinvest the proceeds in such properties as directed by Trustor.
Trustee shall not be liable for any loss or losses sustained by
compliance with any direction of Trustor or through the retention
of any investment directed by Trustor. So long as Trustor lives
and has capacity to do so, Trustor shall have the right to vote
any voting stock which is part of the trust estate, and upon
written request of Trustor, Trustee shall deliver to Trustor
appropriate proxies for the voting of any such stock or shall vote
such stock as directed by Trustor. Trustee shall not be
responsible or liable for any loss or losses sustained through the
voting of such stock by Trustor or as directed by Trustor.
§2.5 Administration of Insurance Policies. Trustor reserves
the right by Trustor's own act alone, without the consent or
approval of Trustee, to sell, assign, or hypothecate any policies
of insurance upon Trustor's life of which Trustor is the owner
made payable to Trustee, to exercise any option or privilege
granted by such policies, including, but without limitation of the
generality of the foregoing, the right to change the beneficiaries
of such policies, to borrow any sum in accordance with the
provisions of such policies, to use such policies as collateral,
and to receive all payments, dividends, surrender values, benefits
or privileges of any kind which may accrue on account of such
policies during Trustor's lifetime. Trustee shall when requested,
without incurring any liability on its part, approve any such
sale, assignment or hypothecation. Trustee shall not be required
to pay premiums or other charges upon any policy of insurance on
the life of Trustor of which Trustee is the beneficiary and shall
hold such policies of insurance as may be delivered to Trustee
subject to Trustor's order without obligation during Trustor's
life other than the safekeeping of such policies.
§2.6 Determination of Competency by Court. For all purposes
of this trust, Trustor shall be deemed competent unless declared
to be legally incompetent under the laws of the State of Utah.
III.

ADMINISTRATION FOLLOWING TRUSTOR'S DEATH

§3.1 Payment of Debts, Taxes and Expenses Following Trustor's
Death. Following Trustor's death, Trustee may, in Trustee's
discretion, utilize trust properties to discharge part or all of
Trustor's due but unpaid debts, expenses of Trustor's last
illness, burial and the administration of Trustor's estate and any
estate, inheritance or other death taxes arising at or because of
Trustor's death, together with interest and penalties thereon, if
any. Trustee shall consult with Trustor's Personal Representative
in determining the source from which such debts, expenses, taxes,
interest and penalties, if any, shall be paid, using assets of
Trustor's estate or properties of the trust, or both, to the
extent appropriate.
53.2 Purchase of AsseLa from Estate, ix>an to Estate. Trustee
shall have discretion to purchase assets from Trustor's estate at
their fair market value as determined by Trustee and the Personal
Representative of Trustor's estate and/or to advance funds with or
without interest and with or without security to the Personal
Representative of Trustor's estate to enable the Personal
Representative of Trustor's estate to pay such debts, expenses
and taxes.
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§3.3 Use of "Flower Bonds" to Pay Tax. In the event at the
time of Trustor's death the trust estate includes any U. S.
Treasury bonds trading at less than par value and which may be
redeemed at par value plus accrued interest in payment of federal
estate taxes, to the extent of the federal estate tax arising by
reason of Trustor's death, Trustee shall deliver such bonds to the
Personal Representative of Trustor's estate and the trust shall
terminate with respect to such bonds or Trustee shall redeem such
bonds in payment of the federal estate tax, and if such bonds are
insufficient to pay such tax in full and if necessary for the
redemption of such bonds at par, Trustee shall pay from the trust
estate the remaining federal estate tax. As used herein, federal
estate tax includes interest and penalties thereon, if any.
§3.4 Exercise of Discretionary Powers by Trustee. Except
with respect to the payment of the federal estate tax by the
redemption of bonds as above provided, nothing herein contained
shall subject any properties of the trust estate to any claims
against or liabilities of Trustor or the estate of Trustor to
which such properties would not otherwise be subject, and Trustee
shall not use, in paying any death taxes, properties of the trust
estate which are not includable in Trustor's gross estate for such
death tax purposes. Trustee may exercise its discretion hereunder
in the best interests of both the beneficiaries under Trustor's
will and of the trusts created under this Trust Agreement, and it
is Trustor's intention that Trustee will exercise its discretion
so that any specific gifts in the will of Trustor may be satisfied
in full.
53.5 Payments to be Made Within Five Years. All payments
pursuant to the provisions of Section 3.1 above other than
deferred and/or installment payments of estate and/or inheritance
taxes, shall be made not later than five (5) years after Trustor's
death; provided, however, that any obligation to make deferred
and/or installment payments of estate or inheritance taxes may be
assumed by Trustee of the Family Trust created under Article IV
below, and the gift provided in Article IV may be funded prior to
full payment of such estate and/or inheritance taxes.
53.6 Household and Personal Effects. Trustor intends to
leave at Trustor's death one or more written documents executed
pursuant to the provisions of U.C.A. section 75-2-513 (Utah
Uniform Probate Code) providing for disposition of part or all of
Trustor's tangible personal and household effects. Any such
written document shall be deemed an amendment to this Trust
Agreement to the extent it purports to dispose of any such
tangible personal or household effects which have been transferred
to Trustee. Therefore, in the event Trustee receives any of
Trustor's or Trustor's Spouse's household and/or personal effects,
including silverware, chine, linens, furniture, furnishings and
supplies, rugs, books, paintings, pictures, musical instruments,
or similar articles of domestic use or adornment, or personal
jewelry, clothing and sporting equipment, Trustee shall distribute
said items of tangible personal and household effects in
accordance with the provisions of said written document or
documents. In the event Trustor's Spouse Survives Trustor.
Trustee shall distribute t? Trustor'*> Spouse all of the household
and personal effects held or received by Trustee which have not
been otherwise diposed of by such written document or documents.
If Trustor's Spouse does not Survive Trustor, however, Trustee
shall have absolute discretion to distribute said household and
personal effects in equal shares (or as nearly equal shares as
Trustee deems practicable) to Trustor's Children who are then
living, or to sell or to retain such items, and, if retained,
Trustee shall have no investment responsibility with respect to
such items. If retained, Trustee shall have discretion to allow
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Trustor's Children the use and possession of such items without
responsibility for their safekeeping and to distribute such items
outright to Trustor's Children for the use and benefit of any or
all of Trustor's Children, prior to the termination of the trust,
in such manner, shares and at such times as Trustee deems
appropriate.
S3.7 Legacies. Trustee shall, as soon as practicable after
Trustor's death, distribute out of the residue of the trust estate
remaining after the payments provided for in Section 3.1 above,
the following gifts to the following persons:
(a) Automobiles. To Trustor's Spouse, if Trustor's
Spouse Survives Trustor, any automobiles or other motor
vehicles or any interest therein that Trustor may dispose of
by this Trust Agreement, together with all insurance policies
relating thereto.
(b) Club Memberships. To Trustor's Spouse, if Trustor's
Spouse Survives Trustor, any social or athletic club
memberships, certificates or other interests in such clubs
that Trustor owns at Trustor's death and may dispose of by
this Trust Agreement.
IV.

FAMILY SHARE - GIFT IN TRUST

S'4.1 Creation of Family Trust. Upon Trustor's death, whether
or not Trustor's Spouse Survives Trustor, all of the rest and
residue of the trust estate, after the payments and distributions
provided for in Article III above, shall constitute the Family
Trust, and Trustee shall hold, manage, invest and reinvest the
trust estate and shall collect the income therefrom and shall
dispose of the net income, accumulated income and principal
subject to and in accordance with Sections 4.2 through 4.7 below.
The trust created under this Article IV shall be known as the
Family Trust.
S4.2 Income to Trustor's Spouse. For so long as Trustor's
Spouse lives, Trustee shall pay to or apply for the benefit of
Trustor's Spouse the net income from the trust estate in monthly
or other convenient installments, not less frequently than
annually.
§4.3 Discretionary Invasion of Principal for Spouse. For so
long as Trustor's Spouse lives, after having considered other
funds available for Trustor's Spouse, Trustee shall have
discretion to retain or to distribute to or apply for the benefit
of Trustor's Spouse, in addition to such income benefits, so much
or all of the principal of the trust estate as Trustee determines
is needed to support Trustor's Spouse in Trustor's Spouse's
accustomed manner of living and as is needed for the maintenance
of health, including medical, dental, hospital and nursing
expenses and expenses of invalidism.
In exercising discretion to
make such distributions, Trustee may consider other property and
sources of income available to Trustor's Spouse.
54.4 Qccupanry of Rocinon^a
a^y ^.r.terect in reel property
and improvements used by Trustor as a personal residence which is
held or received by Trustee shall be administered for the benefit
of Trustor's Spouse as long as Trustor's Spouse lives. In the
event Trustor's Spouse Survives Trustor and for so long as
Trustor's Spouse lives, Trustee shall have discretion to retain
such interest in real property and improvements for so long as
Trustor's Spouse desires, and is able, to occupy said real
property and improvements as a residence and, while so retained,
Trustee shall not be required to sell said real property and
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impovements for the purpose of investing the proceeds thereof and
shall not be under any liability or obligation by reason of any
loss of, damage to, or depreciation in value of said real property
and improvements. With respect to such real property and
improvements as are retained, Trustee shall have discretion to
allow Trustor's Spouse, for so long as Trustor's Spouse lives, the
use and possession of such real property and improvements without
any responsibility to charge or collect any amounts as rent for
the use and possession of the premises so long as such use and
possession represents net income of the trust estate or is needed
to support Trustor's Spouse in such Spouse's accustomed manner of
living.
§4.5 Creation of Separate Shares and Distribution. Upon the
death of the Survivor of Trustor and Trustor's Spouse, Trustee
shall divide the remaining trust estate into as many equal shares
as the sum of (i) the number of Trustor's then living Children and
(ii) the number of Trustor's deceased Children who have then
living Descendants. Trustee shall thereupon transfer and
distribute one such equal share to each of Trustor's then living
Children. Trustee shall administer one such equal share not so
distributed for the benefit of the living Descendants of each
deceased Child of Trustor in accordance with the provisions of
Section 4.6 hereof.
§4.6 Continuing Trust for Descendants of Deceased Children.
After the creation of such separate shares, Trustee shall
administer as a separate trust a share for the benefit of the
living Descendants of each deceased Child of Trustor in accordance
with the following provisions, which shall apply to each such
trust:
(a>
Benefits. For the duration of the trust, Trustee
shall have discretion to distribute to, or to apply for the
benefit of, the living Descendants of such deceased Child of
Trustor such part or all of the net income, accumulated income
and principal of the trust estate in such amounts, manner and
proportions as Trustee deems appropriate, after having
considered other income and properties of each person of such
class, to support, maintain and educate each of the living
Descendants of such deceased Child of Trustor.
(b) Distribution. The trust shall terminate when all of
the living Children of such deceased Child of Trustor have
attained the age of twenty-one (21) years or sooner died, and
Trustee shall thereupon distribute the trust estate in equal
shares by right of representation to the living Descendants of
such deceased Child of Trustor. In the event all of the
Descendants of a deceased Child of Trustor die prior to
distribution, such trust shall thereupon terminate and Trustee
shall distribute the trust estate in equal shares by right of
representation to Trustor's then living Descendants with the
Trustee of each of the other separate trusts herein created
for the benefit of Descendants of a deceased Child of Trustor
receiving the share of such deceased Child.
54* *? Contingent Remainder. In the f»venf th#»ro *r«» no b'winn
Descendants of Trustor upon the termination of any trust, Trustee
shall divide the trust estate into two equal shares and shall
distribute one such equal share to the then living heirs of
Trustor and the other equal share to the then living heirs of
Trustor's Spouse. Such heirs shall be determined at the time of
distribution under the laws of the State of Utah then in effect.
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V.

TRUSTEE

S5.1 Powers of Trustee. Trustee, as a fiduciary, in the
administration of all trusts created by this Trust Agreement,
shall, except as otherwise limited in Article II above or in
Section 5.8 below, have all powers conferred upon trustees by law,
includingf but not by way of limitation, those powers enumerated
in Part 4, Chapter 7 of Title 75 (the Utah Uniform Probate Code)
U.C.A., and in addition Trustee, as fiduciaryf acting reasonably
and for the benefit of the interested persons, shall have the
following additional specific powers:
(a) Retain Assets. Trustee shall have power to retain
indefinitely assets received by Trustee from Trustor during
life or as part of, or from, Trustor's estate r so long as in
Trustee's judgment it is advisable to do so.
(b) Carry on Trade or Business. Trustee shall have
power to carry on in the same form, to continue to hold
indefinitely and to expand, any trade, business or other
enterprise, whether or not incorporated, which was carried on
by Trustor in Trustor's lifetime, so long as in Trustee's
judgment it is advisable to do so.
(i) to invest additional sums in any such business,
incorporated or unincorporated, even to the extent that
any trust hereby created may be invested largely or
entirely in any such business;
(ii) to act as or to select other persons
^{including any beneficiary hereunder) to act as
directors, officers or other employees of any such
business, the same to be compensated without regard to
their being a fiduciary or beneficiary hereunder? and
(iii) to make such other arrangements in respect
thereof as Trustee shall deem proper. Trustee shall be
entitled to reasonable compensation, in addition to the
regular fee allowed by statute, rule of court or local
custom for Trustee services rendered, for services
performed in the management and operation of any such
business.
(c) Retain Partnership Interests. Trustee shall have
power to retain and to hold indefinitely any interest in any
partnership in which Trustor was a partner, so long as in
Trustee's judgment it is advisable to do so.
(d) Conversion of Assets to Limited Partnership
Interests. Trustee shall have power to convert any property
or business interest held by Trustee into a limited partner's
interest in a limited partnership, if in Trustee's judgment it
is advisable to do so.
(G)
Releases. Trustee shall have power to execute and
deliver full or partial releases, by deed or otherwise, with
re«?norf to any conditional t»al« turaract, mortgage, deed of
trust, or security agreement, on real or personal property
sold or held as security by Trustor or by Trustee, in exchange
for full or part cash payment of sums remaining due, or for
the purchaser's or debtor's note for the sum remaining due
secured by security which in Trustee's judgment is adequate.
(f)
Borrowing. Trustee may borrow money for, or lend
money at a reasonable rate of interest to, any trust created
herein, to be secured by the assets of the trust as against
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the beneficiaries, whenever in Trustee's judgment such a loan
would protect such trust or would otherwise be in the best
interests of the beneficiaries thereof.
(g) Prudent Man Standard. Trustee may invest and
reinvest funds and other assets in such properties as men of
prudence, discretion and intelligence purchase for their own
accounts, having regard not to speculation, but to the
permanent disposition of their funds and considering the
probable income as well as the probable safety of their
capital, including but not by way of limitation, common trust
funds, .shares and obligations of Trustee and shares and
obligations of any affiliate, whether or not of the character
otherwise permitted by law for the investment of funds of a
fiduciary.
(h) Direct Distribution to Beneficiary of a Trust
Without Funding Trust. In the event all conditions precedent
to final distribution of any trust created herein have been
satisfied prior to completion of administration of Trustor's
estate and/or the payments and distributions provided for in
Article III above, Trustee may distribute all of the assets,
which would otherwise have been distributed through such
trust, directly to the remainder beneficiary or beneficiaries
without funding the trust.
(i) Distributions Based on Current ValuesConsideration of BasiFI Trustee shall have full power and
discretion in making distribution of the corpus of any trust
estate for which such Trustee is responsible to allocate
assets, in cash or in kind, among the distributees, based upon
values on the date or dates of distribution, except to the
extent that any such allocation may conflict with other
specific provisions or directions contained in this Trust
Agreement. Trustee shall have the power to cause any share to
be composed of cash, property and/or an undivided fractional
interest in property, which undivided fractional interest in
property may be different in kind from any undivided
fractional interest in property distributed as part of any
other share. In making such allocations, Trustee is
authorized, but shall not be required, to take into account
the basis for gain or loss which each asset will carry in the
hands of the distributee and the circumstances of the
distributee with respect to the tax consequences of holding
and disposing of the asset to the extent such circumstances
are known to, or anticipated by, Trustee.
(j) Administration Outside Utah. The statutory powers
referred to in this Section are incorporated herein by
reference. In the event Trustee shall administer all or a
portion of any trust created hereunder in a jurisdiction other
than the State of Utah, Trustee, successor Trustee or
Co-Trustees shall have, with respect to all or any portion of
the trust estate, all of the powers of a trustee referred to
in this Section, including those so incorporated by reference.
55.2 Exculpatory Provisions. The liabilities of Trust-pp
which might arise out of administration of the provisions of this
Trust Agreement shall be limited as follows:
(a) Relating to Acts of Predecessor Trustees. No
successor Trustee shall be liable or responsible in any way
for any damage or loss to the trust estate resulting from, or
occasioned by, anything done or neglected to be done by any
predecessor Trustee, nor shall a successor Trustee be
obligated to obtain an accounting from, or on behalf of, any
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predecessor Trustee, but such successor Trustee shall be
liable only for his acts and conduct, not the failure to act
or omissions, of a predecessor Trustee and shall incur no
liability for receiving in trust property transferred to him,
her or it as Co-Trustee or successor Trustee of his, her or
its own acts and defaults in respect to property actually
received by him, her or it as such Trustee.
(b) Relating to Life Insurance Proceeds. Upon the death
of Trustor or upon the maturity of any policy maturing prior
to the death of Trustor, in the event Trustee is named
recipient of the proceeds and upon receiving possession of the
policy or policies, Trustee shall use reasonable efforts to
collect all sums payable on such policies, which sums upon
receipt shall become part of the trust estate. Trustee may
compromise, arbitrate or otherwise adjust claims upon any of
the policies. The receipt of Trustee to the insurer shall be
a full and complete release and discharge of the insurer, and
the insurer is not required to see to the application of the
proceeds of any policy of insurance. Trustee shall not be
responsible for any acts or omissions of Trustor in connection
with or relating to any policy and shall not be required to
prosecute any action to collect any insurance or to defend any
action relating to any policy of insurance unless indemnified
against costs and expenses, including attorneys' fees.
(c) Relating to Reliance on Documents. Any Co-Trustee
or designated, named or appointed successor Trustee, without
any liability or requirement of investigation, may rely upon
the document designating, naming or appointing it as such if
it is attached to any executed copy of this Trust Agreement
and if such fiduciary does not have actual possession of a
subsequent, contrary or conflicting document. Any Trustee,
without any liability or requirement of investigation, may
rely upon the terms of and provisions for distribution of the
trusts under this Trust Agreement based solely on the executed
documents in its actual possession. Any Trustee hereunder
ceasing to act as such shall deliver all executed copies of
this Trust Agreement and amendments and designations incident
thereto in its possession to the successor Trustee.
(d) Relating to Powers Retained by Trustor. For so long
as Trustor lives. Trustee shall comply with all written
directions made by Trustor with respect to the retention,
sale, exchange or other acquisition, disposition, investment
or reinvestment of any property held by Trustee. Trustee
shall be immune from all liability by reason of complying with
such written directions of Trustor.
§5.3 Succession. The following provisions shall govern
succession to the Trusteeship:
(a) Successor Trustee. Upon the death, resignation or
inability of Bonnie Lou L. Kaufman to serve as Co-Trustee,
Derek Kaufman shall serve as Co-Trustee in her stead. Upon
the death, resignation or inability of Ralph Hugh Haycock to
SPTVP »<* r n - T r n « 5 f A 6 (
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Co-Trustee in his stead.
(b) Resignation. Any Trustee acting hereunder may
resign at any time by delivery of a written notice and final
accounting to Trustor, if alive and competent, but if Trustor
is not alive and competent, to successor Trustee named herein,
if any, and to any adult beneficiaries. In the event of the
resignation, refusal or inability to act of the last successor
Trustee acting or appointed to act hereunder, Trustor, if
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alive and competent, otherwise such adult beneficiaries,
acting unanimously, as the case may be, may appoint a
successor Trustee to administer the trust estate.
§5.4 Waiver of Bond. No Trustee or successor Trustee
hereunder shall be required to give any bond or other security for
the faithful performance of its duties, powers and discretions.
§5.5 Compensation. Trustee shall be entitled to reasonable
compensation for services rendered.
$5.6 Delegation. Any individual Co-Trustee acting hereunder
may, by an instrument signed, acknowledged and delivered to the
other Co-Trustee, delegate any rights or powers to the other
Co-Trustee, and, after such delegation, shall have no further
responsibility with respect to the exercise of such rights or
powers so long as such delegation shall remain in effect. Any
such delegation may be revoked by a similar instrument so
delivered at any time.
§5.7 Income and Principal. Except as otherwise specifically
provided herein, Trustee shall determine what is allocable to
principal and what is allocable to income of a trust in accordance
with the provisions of the Utah Revised Uniform Principal and
Income Act, sections 22-3-1 ejb seq, U.C.A.
(a) Securities Purchased at a Premium. Trustee shall
have full discretion to amortize in whole or in part, by
sinking fund or otherwise, the premium on securities received
or purchased at a premium, or to treat as income the gross
return thereon. Without limiting Trustee's absolute
discretion, it is Trustor's desire that such premiums be
amortized only when Trustee shall determine that the failure
to amortize would result in a substantial impairment of
principal.
(b) Matters Not Covered by Statute. Trustee shall have
full discretion to determine what is allocable to principal
and what is allocable to income with respect to matters not
provided for either by the Utah Revised Uniform Principal and
Income Act or by specific provision of this Trust Agreement.
(c) Fees and Administrative Expenses. Trustee shall
have full discretion to allocate fees and administrative
expenses to income, or to principal, or part to each.
§5.8 Limitations on Powers of Trustee. Any provision of law
or of this Trust Agreement to the contrary notwithstanding, the
powers of Trustee, otherwise granted by law or by this Trust
Agreement, shall be limited or restricted as follows:
(a) Stock of "Controlled" Corporation. If at Trustor's
death Trustor owns any stock of a "controlled corporation"
within the meaning of I.R.C. section 2036 which was received
by Trustor by gift from Trustor's Spouse, and if Trustor's
Spouse Survives Trustor and serves as a fiduciary or
co-fiduciary hereunder, all power to vote such stock which is,
oi might be construed as, a retainea voting right within the
meaning of said provision of the Code shall be vested solely
in the other co-fiduciary, if any, or if there is none, then
in the person or persons named as successor fiduciary
hereunder, or who may be appointed pursuant to law, as a
special fiduciary for the purpose of exercising such power.
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(b) Other Limitations Found in Trust Agreement. Trustee
shall abide by the limits placed on Trustee's power in Article
V above, as well as those found elsewhere in this Trust
Agreement.
VI.

DEFINITIONS AND RULES FOR CONSTRUCTION

56.1 Spouse. Trustor is presently married to the Spouse
identified on the Schedule of Family Members attached hereto and
by reference made a part hereof. References herein to Trustor's
"Spouse" shall be deemed to refer to said Spouse during Trustor's
lifetime while said Spouse lives so long as Trustor is not
divorced or legally separated from said Spouse. In the event said
Spouse predeceases Trustor, or if Trustor and said Spouse are
divorced or legally separated at Trustor's death, for all purposes
of the provisions of this Trust Agreement which take effect at or
after Trustor's death, said Spouse shall not be deemed to be
Trustor's Surviving Spouse. In the event Trustor remarries
following the death of, or Trustor's divorce from, Trustor's
present Spouse, all references herein to Trustor's Spouse shall be
deemed to apply to such subsequent Spouse subject to the same
conditions as are provided above with respect to determination of
the status of Trustor's present Spouse.
§6.2 Child and Descendant. Trustor's present living Child as
well as Trustor's Spouse's present living Children are identified
on the Schedule of Family Members attached hereto and by this
reference made a part hereof. Whenever used herein, the terms
"Child" and "Children" refer, not only to all of Trustor's
children, but also to Trustor's Spouse's children, and the terms
"issue" and "Descendants" include descendants of Trustor's
Spouse's children, adopted Children of any generation and
Descendants of adopted Children of any generation as well as
natural Children and natural Descendants. Trustor desires and
intends to treat Trustor's Spouse's children and their descendants
in all respects the same as Trustor's own child and her
descendants.
Any Descendant of Trustor (natural or adopted, living or
deceased) who is subsequently adopted by any other person shall
continue to be deemed for all purposes (including the rights of
his or her Descendants) as a Descendant of Trustor and not as a
Descendant of the subsequently adopting parent.
§6.3 Gender. For all purposes of this Trust Agreement, where
applicable, the masculine includes the feminine and the neuter,
and vice versa.
§6.4 Singular or Plural. For all purposes of this Trust
Agreement, where applicable, the singular includes the plural, and
vice versa.
§6.5 Survivorship. For all purposes of this Trust Agreement,
the word "Survive" in its various forms shall be defined,
construed and interpreted in accordance with the following
presumptions:
la) Survivorship ot Trustor. In the event Trustor's
Spouse and Trustor die under circumstances whereby there is no
sufficient evidence that they died otherwise than
simultaneously, it shall be presumed that Trustor "Survived"
Trustor's Spouse and all properties of this trust shall be
administered as though Trustor Survived Trustor's Spouse.
(b) Survivorship of Others. In the event any other
beneficiary of any trust created by this Trust Agreement shall
die prior to the expiration of a period of thirty (30) days
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from the date of the event entitling such beneficiary to
benefits, then for the purposes of such trust it shall be
deemed that such beneficiary did not "Survive" such event, and
the trust properties shall be administered and distributed as
though such beneficiary had predeceased such event? provided,
however, that this provision shall not be applied to a
termination of a trust pursuant to Section 7.2 hereof.
(c) Predeceased, Each beneficiary who, under
subsections (a) or (b) above, is presumed not to have Survived
Trustor and/or an event entitling said beneficiary to
benefits, shall accordingly be deemed to have, respectively,
"Predeceased" Trustor and/or such event.
§6.6 Effect of Spendthrift Clause on Powers of Appointment.
The provisions of Section 7.1 below shall not be construed to
prevent or prohibit any beneficiary from exercising any powers of
appointment granted to such beneficiary by the provisions of any
trust created by this Trust Agreement.
§6.7 Situs. This trust has been created in the State of Utah
and its validity, construction and all rights, duties, privileges,
powers and immunities created by it shall be governed by the laws
of the State of Utah.
56.8 Severability. If any provision of this instrument is
unenforceable, the remaining provisions, nevertheless, shall be
carried into effect.
$6«9 Headings. Headings are provided herein for Articles,
Sections and subsections primarily for convenience of reference.
However,^said headings are a part of the text of this Trust
Agreement and may be utilized as an aid to interpretation where
the context permits. In the event, however, that there is a
conflict or inconsistency between a heading and the text material
organized under that heading, the latter shall control. It is not
intended that all headings be comprehensively descriptive of text
materials organized under said headings.
§6.10 U.C.A. References herein to "U.C.A." refer to Utah
Code Annotated, 1953, and all references to specific sections
thereof refer to the sections cited, as they presently exist, as
well as to future amended or successor provisions dealing with the
same subject matter.
VII.

MISCELLANEOUS

57.1 Benefits are Insulated. No beneficiary of any of the
trusts created by this Trust Agreement shall have power to pledge,
mortgage, encumber, anticipate, assign, sell or in any manner
transfer or hypothecate any interest which said beneficiary may
have or may expect to have in any property distributable to such
beneficiary, whether income or principal, and whether such
distribution is vested, discretionary or contingent; and such
interest of any beneficiary shall not be liable or subject in any
manner to or for the debts, contracts, liabilities, engagements,
obligations or torts of such beneficiary, in favor of any person
or entity, including creditors, betrotheds, Spouses and
ex-Spouses, while said property is in the possession of Trustee.
57.2 Perpetuities Period Limits Term of Trusts.
Notwithstanding anything herein contained to the contrary, no
trust created by this Trust Agreement shall continue for more than
twenty-one (21) years after the death of the last Survivor of the
class consisting of Trustor, Trustor's Spouse and Trustor's
Descendants who are living at the date of this Trust Agreement.
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If any trust created by this Trust Agreement shall not have
terminated at, or prior to the expiration of, such period, Trustee
shall, at the expiration of such period, distribute all of the
trust properties as provided in such trust as though the time for
distribution had occurred, and the trust shall thereupon terminate.
EXECUTED the date first above written.

Trustor, Ellen S. Haycock

Trustee, Ralph Hugh Haycock

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)

ss.

G

day of
1983, personally
On the
appeared before me, Ellen S. Hancock, known by me to be the signer
of the foregoing document, who duly acknowledged to me that she
executed the same.

My Commission Expires:

\% MS

S( CrsWrtOL.
V X-^>o- C
Notary Public^
~
Residing at V^^XKAJOLSJO

, Utah
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LAW OFFICES OF

DON II I IAYCOCK& ASSOCIATES
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORA I ION
7321 WI-Sll.AWN AVFNUF.
LOS ANCiKIJ'S.CA 90045

Tel: 310/641-3921
Fax: 310/641-6638
June 7, 2000

UTAH STATE BAR
Office of Professional Conduct
645 South 200 East, Suite 310
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 - 3834
lie: Professional Misconduct of the Law Firm ofRA ) \ QVINNEY & NEBEKER
and its Attorney Narrvel E. Hall
Dear Sits/Madams:

The Law Firm of RAY, QUINNEY & NEF3EKER and its attorney Narrvel E.
Hall are charged with violation of the following Rules of Professional Conduct in its
administration of the Estale of Obed C. Haycock:
(a)

Rule L4 Communications.

While retained as attorney for the Obed. C. Haycock Estate, Attorney Narrvel
Hall failed to inform its personal representative of secret communications he had with the second
wife of Obed Haycock, Ellen Haycock, and her daughter Bonnie Kaufman, in which they
requested he take actions on their behalf that were both adverse to rights of the other heirs and
violated Obed Haycock's testamentary documents. Specifically in one incidence, they requested
that he secretly prepare and record for Ellen Haycock an Affidavit of Surviving Joint Tenant of
Obed and Ellen Haycock's Residence to eliminate the other heirs from receiving their shares of
this Residence as Obed Haycock had provided in the "Restated Trust Agreement" Attorney
Narrvel E. Hall had prepared for him and which he executed on April 5, 1983.
(b) Rule I. 7 Conflict of Interest.
Attorney Narrvel E. Hall clandestinely counseled and represented Ellen Haycock
and her daughter Bonnie Kaufman in matters adverse to the rights of the other heirs; and, to Obed
Haycock's testamentary documents under which his estate was to be administered. These
consultations and related matters were kept secret from the Personal Representative of Obed
Haycock's Estate and all of his children.
1
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(c). Rule 1.6 ( \)iiflicl of Interest; Prohibited Transactions.
For a fee that was kept secret from Obcd Haycock's Personal Representative and
all of his children, Attorney Narrvel E. Hall clandestinely accepted employment from Ellen
Haycock and her daughter Bonnie Kaufman to secretly prepare a legal document adverse to the
other heirs of the Estate of Obcd 1 laycock. He prepared this document at the time he was legal
counsel for this Estate.
Defendant Narrvel Hall and Senior Pattncr of the Law Firm of RAY, QUINNEY
& NEBEKER, Attorney Albert Bowen, represented Ellen Haycock and Bonnie Kaufman from
April, 1984 to November 1984 after the Petsonal Representative ofObed C. Haycock's Estate,
Ralph II. Haycock, informed Attorney Narrvel E. Hall on April 3, 1984 that this Law Firm's
icprcsentation of this Estate was terminated. However, from April 3, 1984 through November 2,
1984 they continued providing legal service to Ellen Haycock and Bonnie Kaufman and charged
these services to this Estate. Of the 7.70 hours this Law Firm charged to this Estate during this
period, 6.70 hours were for legal services exclusively provided Ellen Haycock and Bonnie
Kaufman and alleged consultation with Senior Partner Albeit Bowen - all without the presence or
knowledge of Obed Haycock's Personal Representative or any of his children. After allegedly
administering the probate of this Estate for a year - this Law Fifm failed to take the appropriate
action to close probate.

FACTUAL SUMMARY
The complainant Don II. Haycock is an attorney licensed by the State of California
and authorized by the State Bar of Utah to represent a bother and two sisters in pro has vice in
two lawsuits he filed in the Utah Third District Court regarding the administration of the Estate of
his father, Obcd C. 1 laycock In these lawsuits he is representing as plaintiffs four of the five
children of Obcd C. Haycock from his fust wife that died in 1963; Richard O. Haycock, Mary
Lois Porter (Lois Porter), Jean Smith and himself, Don H. Haycock, in pro se.
The defendants are the Estate of Ellen S. Haycock, Obed C. Haycock's second
wife that died in 1999, and her only child Bonnie L. Kaufman.
One lawsuit concerns the inheritance rights to Obed and Ellen Haycock's
Residence that they occupied before their deaths. Specifically at issue is whether these parties
held title to the Residence as tenauts-in-cornmon or as joint tenants. They took title as joint
tenants when they acquired the Residence in 1964. However, to save on estate taxes, in 1979
they deeded the Residence to themselves as tenants-in-common but did not record the deed. At a
April 20, 2000 hearing on defendants' motions for summary judgment, the court held that the
because the tenancy-in-common deed was not recorded, the joint tenancy deed prevailed.
Defendants' attorneys were informed that the court's ruling would be appealed.
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In June 1979 the Law Firm of RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER prepared
reciprocal wills and trusts for Ellen and Obed Haycock that provided for all of their children to
receive and equal distribution from both of their estates. They selected this Law Firm because
Ellen Haycock had known Senior Partner Albert Bowen for, "... a long time, long, long time"
and, Mr. Bowen was a friend of Ellen Haycock's deceased husband.
On May 2, 1979 Attorney Herbert Livsey of RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER was
told by Obed Haycock that title to their Residence was to be changed from joint tenancy to
tenancy-in-common because of the adverse estate and income tax consequences of having the
Residence in joint tenancy. Obed 1 laycock specifically communicated to Livsey, "go for estate
tax savings." Accordingly, Attorney Livsey prepared the tenancy-in-common deed to which Obed
and Ellen Haycock's signatures were acknowledged before a notary public.
In March 1983 Obed and Ellen Haycock requested the Law Firm of RAY,
QUINNEY & NEBEKER to revise their reciprocal wills and trusts. Attorney Narrvel E. Hall was
assigned this task and their "Restated" reciprocal wills and trusts were executed on April 5, 1983.
The trusts were based on Obed and Ellen Haycock holding title to their Residence as fenants-incommon and not as joint tenants so that after Obed Haycock's death his share of the Residence
would go to Ellen Haycock for life an then to a family trust for distribution to his children and
Bonnie Kaufman in equal shares. Ellen Haycock's "Restaicd^fust Agreement" had the same
reciprocal provisions. Attorney Narrvel E Hall testified in his deposition that he prepared the
Obed and Ellen Haycock \s "Restated Trust Agreements" so that their Residence could be
divided between thenu
Attorney Hall had been told that Obed Haycock had had multiple strokes and was
in poor health. He died in December of that year. The Law Firm of RAY, QUINNEY &
NEBEKER was then retained by Obed Haycock's Personal Representative, Ralph H. Haycock, to
administer both the probate of his estate and his Restated Trust Agreement. Attorney Narrvel E.
Hall was assigned this task. He had prepared the "Restated Trust Agreements" that Obed and
Ellen Haycock executed on April 5, 1983.
In January 1984 Attorney Narrvel E. Hall provided documentation to Obed
Haycock's Personal Representative indicating that Obed and Ellen Haycock in 1979 had deeded
their Residence to themselves as tenants-in-common to reduce estate taxes. This was consistent
with the provisions in their restated trusts and wills that Attorney Narrvel E. Hall had prepared for
them.
On March 22, 1984 Attorney Narrvel E. Hall - while employed by Obed
Haycock's Personal Representative to administer the Obed C. Haycock Estate - received the
following telephone message from Bonnie Kaufman via his secretary:
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"Obed Haycock, title in mother \s name, no quit claim
I the tenancy-in-common deed] recorded. Please do not
mention to any member of the family. Mother wants it forgotten. "
Attorney Narrvcl E. I lall testified in his deposition that prior to March 22, 1984,
he had two telephone conversations with Bonnie Kaufman that consumed forty-eight minutes
regarding this tenancy-in-common deed.
Attorney Narrvel E. Hall testified in his deposition that on, or about, March 21,
1984 in a telephone conversation with Bonnie Kaufman, he stated that he was going to resolve
how title to Obed and Ellen Haycock's Residence was held by referring to their 1979 Federal Gift
Tax Return. This 1979 Federal Gift Tax Return he referred to indicated that Obed and Ellen
Haycock held title to their Residence as tenants-in-common.
Disregarding this evidence - and while employed by Personal Representative of
Obed Haycock's Estate - Attorney Narrvel E. Hall clandestinely prepared and recorded an
Affidavit of Surviving Joint Tenant for Ellen Haycock based on the 1964 joint tenancy deed. He
did this without informing the Obed Haycock's Personal Representative or any of his children.
This Affidavit of Surviving Joint Tenant was notfdtecovered by any of Obed
Haycock's children until the Summer of 1998 when Richard Haycock, one of Obed's sons,
discovered it in the records of the Salt Lake County Recorder. This lawsuit followed.
Attorney Narrvel E. Hall claims he prepared the Affidavit of Surviving Joint
Tenant base on his rough hand-written notes of alleged conversations between the "Haycocks and
Senior Partner Albert Bowcn on Match 15, 1983 and an alleged telephone conversation with
Obed Haycock on March 29, 1983.
Attorney Narrvel E. Hall testified in his deposition that he did not inform Obed
Haycock's Personal Representative and Obed Haycock's children of the 1979 tenancy-in-common
deed to Obed and Ellen Haycock's Residence until after this lawsuit was filed in 1998 and a copy
of this tcnancy-in-common deed was produced pursuant to a discovery demand.
Attorney Narrvel E. Hall testified in his deposition that he intentionally prepared
Obed and Ellen Haycock's reciprocal "Restated Trust Agreements'1 for the survivor to have a life
estate in the Residence, with the remainder going into a family trust for the children, because
"they might later decide that the tax risk warranted severing joint tenancy." Also, he testified that
he was informed in February 1983, or thereabouts, that Obed Haycock had recently suffered
strokes and felt these strokes were indications of his imminent death.

4

CONCLUSION
Although these charges of attorney misconduct go back to 1984, they were not
discovered until 1998 because this Law Firm and Attorney Narrvel E. Hall kept secret this
misconduct from the children of Obed C. Haycock. They believed in 1984 that this misconduct
would never be discovered because they knew that their co-conspirators — Ellen Haycock and
Bonnie Kaufman ~ would not reveal this conduct because they were the beneficiaries of it.
These charges aic irrelevant to the legal issue of how Obed and Ellen Haycock
held title to their Residence at the time of their respective death, either as joint tenants or as
tenants-in-common. Ethical misconduct is not subservient to arbitrary time constraints like
statutes of limitations. Rather ethical misconduct go directly and completely to one's character
for honesty because a persons character traits are repeated over that person's lifetime.
In March 1983, three months after Obed Haycock's death, this Law Firm and its
attorney Narrvel E. Hall abrogated their sworn commitment to faithfully honor and obey the Rules
of Professional Responsibility of the Utah Bar. Although they were retained to represent Obed
Haycock's Personal Representative in the administration of his Estate and Restated Trust
Agreement - their allegiance shifted from probating this Estate to secretly promoting the desires
and interests of Ellen Haycock and Bonnie Kaufman at th'6 expense of the other heirs to Obed
Haycock's Estate. After a year there was little, if any, meaningful effort to probate this Estate.
Had this Law Firm, its senior partner Albert Bowen and Attorney Narrvel E. Hall,
elected instead to comply with the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct that they swore to obey,
they would have informed Obed Haycock's Personal Representative of this tenancy-in-common
deed - that Ellen Haycock and Bonnie Kaufman asked them to keep secret from Obed Haycock's
family - and provide him with a copy. 1 lad they taken this course, in 1984 this issue could have
been expeditiously and inexpensively resolved by a single declaratory judgment on evidence and
memory that has now disappeared and been forgotten. The cost in attorney fees and court costs
incurred to date to resolve this issue after 1998 is considerable mid continuing to mount.
Accordingly, the Utah State Bar is respectfully requested to discourage this
practice by sternly condemning this conduct by its disciplinary ruling.
.Dated: June 7, 2000
Respectfully submitted,
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AFFIDAVIT OF PLAINTIFF DON II. HAYCOCK

1
2
3

1 I am DON H HAYCOCK the plaintififin this lawsuit AJthough I am

4

appearing as a pro se litigant, I am an attorney admitted to practice before all courts in California,

5

the Federal Courts, and the Supreme Court of the United States I have practiced in all of these

6

courts and have pending cases in the California Courts and the Ninth Federal Circuit. I make this

7

affidavit in support of the incorporated POINTS AND AUTHORITIES submitted in opposition

8

to defendants motion for a protective order from discovery I am one of the sons of decedent

9 II OBED C HAYCOCK (hereafter "OBED") and an heir to his estate
10

2

OBED'S wife died in 1964 and he married his second wife ELLEN S. LYON

11

(hereafter "ELLEN") soon thereafter ELLEN brought into the marriage $21,000 that went

12

towards the purchase of their home He died on December 12, 1983 leaving as heirs his widow

13

ELLEN, her daughter BONNIE L KAUFMAN (hereafter "BONNIE") and five children from his

14 first marriage, JEAN, LOIS, RALPH, RICHARD and plaintiff. After OBED'S first wife died,
15

his five children signed over to him all inheritance rights they had to all properties in their

16

mother's estate.

17

3

18

In 1979 OBED and ELLEN executed reciprocal wills and living trusts that

included a Marital QTIP Trust, funded by OBED'S estate, from which ELLEN would receive the

19 I income for life with the principle then going to OBED'S children and BONNIE in equal shares
20

OBED'S ranch was to be sold and the proceeds distributed in equal shares to his children and

21

BONNIE after his death His testamentary documents included a provision that if ELLEN later

22

disinherited his children in favor of BONNIE then BONNIE would be excluded from sharing in

23

the QTIP Trust and Ranch From 1997 up to OBED'S death in 1983, he continually gave

24

ELLEN taxable assets, e g securities and money, to shield his estate from federal estate tax.

25

Based on letters from ELLEN'S attorney and BONNIE during 1997, that solicited distribution of

26

the QTIP Trust, ELLEN'S estate in 1997 approached one-million dollars ELLEN ad been giving

27

away portions of her estate to BONNIE and other parties in order to reduce the estate taxes
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1

4

During the Christmas season of 1982, OBED told me that he was concerned

2

that ELLEN could possible out-live what he provided for her in his 1979 will and trust He ask

3

me to prepare the necessary testamentary documents that would give her total and unfettered

4 | access to all of his assets during her life, and then what was left was to go the his children and
5

BONNIE in equal shares He told me that the QUIP Trust was to be eliminated but, as previously

6

devised, the proceeds from the sale of the Ranch was to go to his children and BONNIE in equal

7

shares immediately following his death

8

5

1 told him that the only way to accomplish this objective would by with

9

reciprocal wills and a contract between him and ELLEN that could be enforced against either one

10

of them that later decided to disinherit the others1 children He did not favor a contract between

11

him and ELLEN because he told me that they had promised and covenanted with each other that

12

she would not disinherit his children after his death, he trusted her and did not want to do

13

anything that could imply a distrust and worried that such a contract would imply that he

14

distrusted her However he did not trust BONNIE and worried that she could adversely influence

15

ELLEN during her declining years I told him that I would prepare the contract in the most

16

friendly and non-threatening manner possible Since it was always their expressed intentions to

17

distribute their combined estates to all of their children equally, the contract I prepared just

18

reasserts this expressed intention in contractual language, i e "Ellen's testamentary provisions for

19

Obed's children being given in consideration for Obed's testamentary provisions for Ellen's

20

surviving child Bonnie " This "memorandum" is attached hereto an titled MEMORANDUM OF

21

CHANGE IN TESTAMENTARY PLAN (hereafter "memorandum'1) The change mostly being

22

the reciprocal wills that elimination of the trusts — not the expressed intentions of the parties

23

6 Before preparing these documents, I contacted all of my brothers and sisters

24

and explained how our father OBED wanted to change the distribution of his estate so that

25

ELLEN'S could have access to substantially all of his estate during her life, and that they would

26

only share with BONNIE what was left of his estate at ELLEN'S death All were agreeable even

27
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1 || though a substantial portion of OBED'S estate came from his first wife and his children's mother
2 ||

7. In February 1983 I prepared and sent to OBED and ELLEN reciprocal wills

3 || and the "memorandum" along with instructions for their signing of these wills After receiving
4 || these documents they called me and we had a three-way conversation. Both expressed
5 II satisfaction with these documents and both expressed to me that they were ready to sign them. I
6

told them that their signing of the wills had to be witnessed. There was some confusion as to who

7

these witnesses could be and after this conversation I called my brother RICHARD O.

8

HAYCOCK and ask him to go to their house and help them execute the wills.

9

8. Approximately a week later, OBED telephoned and said that ELLEN had

10

taken the wills and "memorandum" to a Utah attorney and was told by this attorney that these

11

documents were "worthless" and, "would be thrown out of court." However, when ELLEN

12

picked up on another phone, she stated that it was BONNIE and not her that had taken these

13

documents to a Utah attorney and she was just repeating what BONNIE had told her. I then

14

informed both of them that I would be in Salt Lake City the following morning to visit this

15

attorney and requested his name No name was provided at that time. OBED expressed outrage

16

to ELLEN for now expressing a different explanation from what he claims she told him; and also

17

that BONNIE had clandestinely without his permission or knowledge interfered. That same day

18

he alone called me back and said he had made an appointment with a Utah attorney for the

19

following morning and told me not to come to Salt Lake City.

20

9. Subsequently these wills and the "memorandum" were reviewed by Utah

21

attorney Hal N. Swenson in a five (5) page letter dated March 23, 1983. A copy of this letter has

22

been served on defendants' attorneys Also, these wills and the "memorandum" were reviewed by

23

attorney Narrvel Hall in his three (3) letter of February 9, 1984 to OBED'S executor and trustee

24

RALPH H. HAYCOCK. A copy of this letter has also been served on defendants' attorneys.

25

Additionally, these attorneys have been served with a five (5) page hand written memorandum by

26

attorney Norrvel Hall that includes a direction he gave OBED and ELLEN to destroy the

27
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1

testamentary documents prepared by plaintiff This memorandum is a copy of an original that was

2

in attorney Norrvel Hall's file and produced pursuant to a motion to produce documents

3
4
5

I, DON H. HAYCOCK, being sworn, state that 1 am a son of decedent OBED C
HAYCOCK and an heir to his estate I affirm and swear that this declaration, consisting of

6 || four(4) pages is true.
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14

Commission Expires

<?? */'
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Reside at: r S S b _ j ^
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17
18
19
20
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22
23
24
25
26
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MEMORANDUM O f CHANGE IN TESTAMENTARY T L A N

On June 28, 1979 we signed and had witnessed our first

testamentary

documents that consisted of both mutual and reciprocal wills and trusts.
Because of gifts that were later made of a portion of the testamentary
property we have prepared new wills, and cancelled the trusts, for the purpose of
accomplishing our common and joint testamentary plan that has never changed or from
which we have never intended to deviate.
On February
new Wills.

, 1983, we (Ellen and Obed) signed and had witnesses our

Our mutual desire has always been that Obed's children and Ellen's children

share equally and without distinction in the estates of both of us. Accordingly, our Wills
of Juno 28, 1979, and the supplementary written Trust Agreements, were both mutual and
reciprocal In the furtherance of this common testamentary

plan.

Although those written Trust Agreements are now cancelled, this Is not to
be interpreted in any way as a change to our common testamentary plan. All children are
to share equally and without distinction in both of our estates.
provisions for Obed's children being given in consldeiation

Ellen's testarncntai y

tor Obed's

testamentary

provisions for Ellen's surviving child Bonnie.
Dated: February

,1983

Ellen S. Haycock

Obed C. Haycock
Witnesses:

Subscribed, sworn to and acknowledged before me, by Obed C. and Ellen 5. Haycock, and
subscribed to before rnc by

and

, witnesses, this

day of February, 1983.

Notary Public
Residing in Salt Lake County, Utah
My Commission expires:
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
* * *

RICHARD O. HAYCOCK, MARY
LOIS PORTER, MARTHA JEAN
SMITH and DON H. HAYCOCK,
Plaintiffs,

Case NO. 98-0910696PR

vs.

Deposition of:

RALPH H. HAYCOCK, TRUSTEE
OF THE OBED C. HAYCOCK
TRUST; BONNIE L. KAUFMAN,
INDIVIDUALLY, BONNIE L.
KAUFMAN, EXECUTRIX OF THE
ELLEN S. HAYCOCK ESTATE,
AND AS BENEFICIARY TO THE
OBED C. HAYCOCK TRUST;
and DOES 1 THROUGH 10,
INCLUSIVE,

NARRVEL E. HALL
Judge Homer Wilkinson

Defendants.

BE IT REMEMBERED that on Monday, the 9th
day of August, 1999, commencing at the hour of 9:10 a.m.,
the deposition of NARRVEL E. HALL, produced as a witness
at the instance and request of the Plaintiffs in the
above-entitled action before the above-named Court, was
taken before Jill Dunford, a Certified Shorthand
Reporter, Utah License No. 244, and Notary Public in and
for the State of Utah, at the offices of Depomax
Reporting Services, 525 Wells Fargo Plaza, 170 South Main
Street, Salt Lake City, Utah.

REPORTING
5?*;

SERVICES,

w n i <=; T A R O O

1TO ^OUIH
'-.All

MAIN

1A K F CITY.

<R< 1 1 ) ^ 2 8

118R/1

n AZA
S l R f r i

/«

I I f A H BA 1 O 1
ROO D E P O M A X

TAX 3 ? R I I R 9

40

INC

1

A

That's a photocopy of my notes dated March

2

28th, 1983, and March 29th, 1983, representing

3

instructions received in telephone calls from

4

Mrs. Haycock and then from Mr. Haycock respectively on

5

those dates.

6

Q

Thank you.

Let me hand you what has been

7

marked as Deposition Exhibit 12. Do you recognize that

8

document?

9

A

I do.

This is a photocopy of my notes of

10

conference, they are in two parts, but dated the same

11

day, March 15th, 1983.

12

represent my notes from conferences of that date with

13

Obed and Ellen Haycock and Albert Bowen.

Both sets of notes purport to

14

(Exhibit Nos. 13 and 14 were

15

marked for identification.)

16,

Q

All right.

Thank you.

Let me hand you what

17

has been marked as Deposition Exhibits 13 and 14. Are

18

those documents that were produced from Ray, Quinney &

19

Nebeker's estate planning files for Ellen and Obed

20

Haycock?

21

A

Yes.

22

Q

Could you identify those documents?

23

A

Exhibit 13 is a photocopy of a file copy of a

24

letter dated August 10th, 1979 addressed to Obed C.

25

Haycock from Herbert C. Livsey of Ray, Quinney & Nebeker,
49
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CERTIFIED

COPY

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

DON H. HAYCOCK,
Plaintiff,
vs .

Civil No. 98-0910696PR

ELLEN S. HAYCOCK, THE
ESTATE OF ELLEN S.
HAYCOCK, BONNIE L.
KAUFMAN (aka BONNIE L.
LYON); AND DOES 1 THRU
10, INCLUSIVE,

Judge Homer Wilkinson

Defendants.

DEPOSITION UPON ORAL EXAMINATION OF
NARRVEL ELWIN HALL

TAKEN AT:

215 South State Street, 13th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah

DATE :

December 1, 1998

REPORTED BY:

Susette M. Snider, CSR, RPR,

CAPITOL

R E POUTERS

A PKOllSSlUNM CO) IK I Kl i ' O K H N d ( O M | ' A N \

Mkllov\n Pla/a
230 boaih SOO I a^l, Mule 5 \0
Salt Lake Uly, H u h 8-1102
N l H M i O M ( 8 0 1 ) 563 7959
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Page 27

first request for production of documents, I can't
find them.

So the copies that I just received

would be the first opportunity I've had to look at
them recently.
Q

Do you recall that they requested any

change that had to do with a provision that was in
their earlier trusts -- I f m talking about the
reciprocal trusts -- that if one of them were to
disinherit the other's children, then that child -then that -- the other party had the right to
disinherit that child of that person?
A

No.

As a matter of fact, my

recollection would be quite the contrary, that I -I believe their instructions were that the survivor
should have the right to disinherit any of either
children for any reason at all as to the assets of
that individual, and I believe we had a discussion
about that.

I -- I recommend to my elderly clients

that they retain that kind of power because the
dynamics of a family change after one of the
parents die.
Q

Okay.

A

And I believe it's advisable for the

survivor to have that kind of power.
MR. HAYCOCK:

SUSETTE M. SNIDER

Okay.

--

I object to that

CAPITOL REPORTERS

last question.
Q

It was nonresponsive.

Let me refer you to the letter of

February 9, 1994.
Ifm

I think that f s Exhibit 7.

And

referring to the second paragraph on the second

page.

And let me read it for the record, and

follow along to make sure I read it correctly.
Starting with the underlined First.

It says,.

First, they both made it very clear
that, while Ellen fully intended to treat her
daughter, Bonnie, and Obed ! s children equally, her
assets were her own and she was not to be under any
legal disability with respect to their use,
management or disposition.

Obed stated that he was

satisfied with an arrangement that adopted only the
residue of his own -A

I believe you missed a word there,

"which protected."
Q

I'm sorry.

-- which protected only the

residue of his own assets for the children, and he
did not in any way want the children to be in a
position to interfere in any way with Ellen's use
or management of those assets which were in her own
name.

The implication clearly was that if any of

Obed's children should treat Ellen badly during the
period she might survive Obed, she would be free to

SUSETTE M. SNIDER

--

CAPITOL REPORTERS

1

disinherit those children with respect to those

2

assets which she separately owned and controlled.

3

You state that there was an

4

implication.

5

an implication from her statement that she intended

6

to treat all children equally as expressed in this

7

letter?

8

A

9

How did you conclude that there was

I believe the reference to the

implication refers to not the intention to treat

10

them equally but the possibility that she might

11

choose not to.

12

Q

Well, how did you arrive that that was

13

implied in their mutual plan for these estate

14

documents?

15

you that led you to believe there was an

16

implication here that Ellen could disinherit Obed's

17

children if they weren't good to her?

In other words, what was expressed to

18

A

We specifically discussed that issue.

19

Q

Do you recall specifically what was,

A

No more than what this says, that --

20
21

said?

22

that -- we discussed the possibility that they

23

could create a joint and contractual plan of

24

disposition which would bind each of them not to

25

change it following the death of the other.

SUSETTE M. SNIDER

I,

CAPITOL REPORTERS
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1

frankly, recommended that they not pursue that

2

course.

3

Q

So you don't recall any specific

4

expressions that caused you to make this

5

implication, it was just something you assumed from

6

the entire --

7

MR. PAYNE:

Objection, to the extent

8

that's a mischaracterization of the witness's

9

testimony.

10

THE WITNESS:

My testimony would be

11

that I recommended that they reserve to each of

12

them the right to make those kinds of decisions

13

following the death of the other and that they

14

accepted my recommendation.

15

Q

(By Mr. Haycock)

So you're saying that

16

the implication was from what you expressed to

17

them?

18

A

That's right.

19

Q

And did they seem to assent to that,

20
21

assent to what you expressed to them?
A

They -- they understood what I

22

expressed to them, and they told me that they

23

wanted an arrangement that provided that kind of

24

flexibility to the survivor.

25

Q

Okay.

Now, early in this -- earlier in

SUSETTE M. SNIDER
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RAY. O U I N N E Y &
5 J OUINNEY
A H NEBEKER
ALBERT R BOWEN
w J O CONNOR JR
MARVIN J BERTOCH
ALONZO W WATSON JR
STEPHEN B NEBEKER
MITCHELL MELICH
L RIOD LARSON
DON B ALLEN
MERLIN O BAKER
STEPHEN H ANDERSON
CLARK P GILES
JAMES W TREED
THOMAS A OLMNN
JAMES L WILDE
M J O H N A5HTON
HERBERT C LIVSEY
WILLIAM A MARSHALL

NEBEKER

PAUL S FELT
GERALD T SNOW
H BRENT BEESLEY
ALAN A ENKE
JONATHAN A DIBBLE
SCOTT H CLARK
JAMES W GILSON
STEVEN H GUNN
JAMES S JAROINE
ROBERT P HILL
KENT H MURDOCK
JANET HUGIE SMITH
JUDITH MITCHELL BILLINGS
ALLEN L ORR
BRAD D HARDY

A T T O R N E Y S AT LAW

SUITE 4 0 0 DESERET BUILDING
7 9 S O U T H MAIN
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 84111

TELEPHONE
(SOU 5 3 2 1 5 0 0

PAUL H RAY (1693 19671
C PRESTON ALLEN 0 9 2 1 19711

April 11, 1979

Mr. & Mrs. Obed C. Haycock
3390 South 2700 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109
Dear Mr. & Mrs. Haycock:
Please find enclosed herewith copies of the following
documents:
1.

Last Will and Testament of Obed C. Haycock.

2.

Last Will and Testament of Ellen S. Haycock.

3.

Trust Agreement, Obed C. Haycock, Trustor and
Ralph Hugh Haycock, Trustee.

4.

Trust Agreement, Ellen S. Haycock, Trustor and
Ralph Hugh Haycock, Trustee.

The documents reflect changes in the federal estate tax
laws as well as the Utah Code. The trust documents, however,
retain the provisions that relate ttTfche distribution t6 youx
—
Tespecftive cHuaren.
~
"~~
The following schedule is, I believe, an accurate summary
of your assets:
Description

Ownership

Various stocks
Various stocks
Residence
Ranch
Automobiles

Joint Tenancy
Obed C. Haycock
Joint Tenancy
Obed C. Haycock

Total

Approximate fair
market value
$ 64,000.00
78,000.00
80,000.00
120,000.00
6,000.00
$348,000.00

50

Mr. and Mrs. Haycock
April 11, 1979
Page 2

I understand you have no life insurance policies and no pension or
profit sharing benefits. I also understand that Mrs, Haycock
contributed approximately one-half of the purchase price of the
residence.
In general, the estate plan is drafted to take advantage
of the marital deduction in Mr. Haycock's estate allowed under the
amended federal estate tax laws. Article IV of the Trust Agreement provides for the marital deduction portion to be held in
trust for Mrs. Haycock. The trust provisions require the net
income to be paid out to Mrs. Haycock. In addition, the principal
or assets of the trust are to be distributed to Mrs. Haycock as
necessary for her proper maintenance and support, to maintain the
standard of living to which she is accustomed and to meet her
extraordinary expenses arising out of illness, accident or other
emergency. In addition, she has a general testamentary power of
appointment over all the assets
of the marital trust.
Pursuant to the formula set forth in Article X of the
trust, the amount allocated to the marital share will be approximately $153,000.00 calculated as follows:
Mr. Haycock
Gross Estate approx.
Less: Exemption Equivalent (1979)
Balance
Marital Deduction
Taxable Estate

$300,000.00
147,333.00
152,667.00
152,667.00
-0-

By 1981 and thereafter, the exemption equivalent will be
$175,625.00 and, therefore, the marital deduction will be
approximately $124,375.00.
While the marital deduction will be between $150,000,00
and $125,000.00 the amount held in the marital deduction trust
(Article IV) will only be approximately $20,000.00 to $50,000.00
because the balance of the marital deduction, or approximately
$104,000.00 will pass to Mrs. Haycock pursuant to the joint
tenancy ownership of the residence and various stocks.
The exclusion of the assets held in the family trust from
Mrs. Haycock's estate is the crucial feature of the estate plan in
terms of tax savings. In other words, the assets passing to the
family trust are not taxed in Mr. Haycock's estate because of the
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Mr. and Mrs. Haycock
April 11, 1979
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exemption ($147,333.00 (1969) to $175,625.00 (1981)) and then also
pass free of estate taxes in Mrs. Haycock's estate because the
assets of the family trust are not included in her estate.
If Mrs. Haycock were to predecease Mr. Haycock the estate
tax results would not be as favorable. This is because all the
joint tenancy property would pass to Mr. Haycock to be included in
his estate. Thus, his estate would total approximately
$350,000.00 and would result in an estate tax of approximately
$52,000.00. To eliminate or reduce this tax, it is necessary that
we transfer assets from joint tenancy to your respective names so
that if Mrs. Haycock predeceases Mr. Haycock, her will and trust
will produce a result similar to the will and trust for Mr.
Haycock; i.e., her assets go into a family trust to be held for
the benefit of Mr. Haycock but not to be included in his estate at
his subsequent death. Therefore, we suggest that you transfer and
divide the stock held in joint tenancy one-half to Mr. Haycock and
one-half to Mrs. Haycock. This would place approximately
$32,000.00 in value in her name. In addition, we would suggest
that Mr. Haycock make an additional gift to Mrs. Haycock of
approximately $70,000.00 in corporate stocks. This would bring
Mrs. Haycock's estate up to approximately $100,000.00 and result
in the following analysis:

Husband dies first (1979)
Husband's gross estate

No Gift

$70,000 Gift plus
$30,000 Joint
Tenancy Split

$300,000.00

$200,000.00

Federal Estate Tax

-0-

Distribution from his
estate to wife

-0-

153,000.00

25,000.00

80,000.00

80,000.00

Wife dies ten years later (1989)
Wife's gross estate
Own assets Joint Tenancy
Residence
Gift from Husband
Held in Marital
Deduction Trust
TOTAL
Federal Estate Tax

-0-

-0-

153,000.00

25,000.00

$233,000.00

$205,000.00

$ 25,000.00

S2

$ 17,000.00

Mr. and Mrs. Haycock
April 11, 1979
Page 4

Thus if Mr. Haycock dies first, there is only a small
reduction in the estate tax savings from a current gift to Mrs.
Haycock of $70,000.00. But if Mrs. Haycock dies first, there is a
tax savings as illustrated by the following example.

Wife dies first (1979)

No Gift

$70,000 Gift plus
$30,000 Joint
Tenancy Split

Wife's gross estate
Residence

$ 40,000.00

Split of Joint
Gift from husband
TOTAL
Federal Estate Tax

$ 40,000.00
30,000.00

-0$ 40,000.00
-0-

70,000.00
$140,000.00
-0-

Husband dies ten years later (1988)
Husband's gross estate
Federal Estate Tax

350,000.00

250,000.00

37,200.00

21,400.00

Thus, the estate tax savings at the subsequent death of
Mr. Haycock, with a prior gift of $70,000.00 to Mrs. Haycock and
the proposed planning, would equal approximately $16,000.00.
Based upon the above examples, it seems appropriate to advise that
Mr. Haycock make a gift to Mrs. Haycock of approximately
$70,000.00 and that the joint tenancy in stocks be split.
I have discussed with you the problem with your residence. If the joint tenancy of the residence were split into
equal ownership by each of you, the estate tax savings would be
approximately $11,800.00 in the second example and approximately
$5,900.00 would be available in the first example. The problem
with splitting the ownership is that after the first spouse dies
one-half of the residence would be held in the family trust and
probably not qualify for the $100,000.00 exclusion from income
taxation upon the sale of a residence. Thus, if the surviving
spouse were to desire to sell the residence, the exclusion would
only apply to one-half of the residence. With the current
uncertainty in the law regarding the carryover basis rules, it is
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Mr. and Mrs. Haycock
April 11, 1979
Page 2
difficult to guess how significant an income tax problem may be
presented by having one-half of a residence in a family trust.
I would suggest we discuss the transfer of the residence
from joint tenancy to one-half ownership as tenants in common. If
you decide to make the change, we will need to add one paragraph
to the trust agreement outlining the provisions relating to the
residence in the trust.
This letter is only intended as an overview of your
estate plan. After you have read the documents, I'm sure you will
have some questions. I have given you copies of the documents
rather than the originals so you may underline words or write
questions in the margins, etc. I think we should get together and
answer your questions and discuss the ownership of your assets
after you have reviewed this letter and the documents.
Sincerely,
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER

Herbert C. Livsey
jcd
Enclosures
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PROOF OF SERVICE
I am a resident of the State of California, over the age of eighteen years, My
business address is Don H. Haycock and Associates, 7321 Westlawn Avenue, Los Angeles,
California 90045. On July 17, 20001 served the following described document,
APPELLANT RELY BRIEF
Court of Appeal Case No. CA 990833
By placing the document listed above in sealed envelope and addressed as stated
on the following page. I then caused these envelopes with first class postage thereon fully paid
and placed in the United States mail in Los Angeles, California in compliance with California
Code of Civ. Proc. 1013 and 2015.5: Code of Federal Civ. Proc. 5(b) or FRAP 25(d); 1 and Rule 5
of the Utah Rules of Court..
I DECLARE UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURY UNDER THE LAWS OF
CALIFORNIA, OF UTAH AND OF THE UNITED STATES THAT THE ABOVE IS TRUE
AND CORRECT; AND THAT THIS DECLARATION WAS EXECUTED IN LOS ANGELES
COUNTY, STATE OF CALIFORNIA
Dated: July 17, 2000

JENNIFER M ERRANDE

Thomas Chnstensen, Jr Esquire (2 copies).
Douglas J. Payne, Esquire
FABIAN & CLENDENIN
P.O. Box 510210
215 South State Street, 12,h Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151-0210
Mr. John A. Adams, Esquire
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
79 South Main Street
P.O. Box 45385
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 - 0385
Ronald Ady, Esquire
51 West Center Street, Suite 172
Orem, Utah 80457
Mr. Michael L. Deamer, Esquire
RANDLE, DEAMER, ZARR, ROMRELL &LEE
139 East South Temple, Suite 330
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

